Social Control Versus Social Stability: a Conceptualization of Contradictory Goals and Hybrid Outcomes on Ethnic Relations, Consumer Satisfaction, and Entrepreneurship in the Former Ussr

ABSTRACT - In this conceptual paper, we contend that two dimensions C Social Control and Social Stability C strongly influence three topics of importance to consumer researchers in the post-coup era of the Former Soviet Union [hereafter referred to as the FSU]: (1) ethnic relations; (2) consumer satisfaction; and (3) private entrepreneurship. Ethnic relations C an ancient source of instability between the 128 ethnic nationalities of the FSU (e.g., Lenin 1917) C are becoming ever more chaotic as the 15 nation-states of the FSU continue to disintegrate in the post-coup era (e.g., Franklin 1992; Krupnik 1991; Shevardnadze 1992). Consumer satisfaction remains an oxymoronic term, as consumer dissatisfaction is the norm in the FSU, not the exception, as widely-publicized throughout the Cold War era (e.g., Bonnell 1989; Heller and Nekrich 1986; Kaiser 1976) and the post-coup era (e.g., Antonian 1992; Khubulava 1992; Soloviev 1992). Entrepreneurship, a reform measure introduced by the Gorbachev administration, has failed to live up to both Western and Soviet expectations (e.g., Lewin 1991; Markov 1992; Piyacheva 1992). We investigate these three subjects C ethnic relations, consumer satisfaction, and entrepreneurship C using contemporary literature and personal observations in the FSU before, during, and after the August 1991 coup. We describe consumer and market conditions in the FSU, contradictory goals of the 15 nations-states, and possible hybrid outcomes of these goals on marketization and democratization.

Citation:

Oleg I. Gubin, Melissa Martin Young, Alexander G. Osipov, and Natasha Kostioutchenko (1993) ,"Social Control Versus Social Stability: a Conceptualization of Contradictory Goals and Hybrid Outcomes on Ethnic Relations, Consumer Satisfaction, and Entrepreneurship in the Former Ussr", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 20, eds. Leigh McAlister and Michael L. Rothschild, Provo, UT : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 89-96.

Advances in Consumer Research Volume 20, 1993      Pages 89-96

SOCIAL CONTROL VERSUS SOCIAL STABILITY: A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONTRADICTORY GOALS AND HYBRID OUTCOMES ON ETHNIC RELATIONS, CONSUMER SATISFACTION, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE FORMER USSR

Oleg I. Gubin, Moscow State University, Russia

Melissa Martin Young, University of Utah

Alexander G. Osipov, University of Utah

Natasha Kostioutchenko, University of Utah

ABSTRACT -

In this conceptual paper, we contend that two dimensions C Social Control and Social Stability C strongly influence three topics of importance to consumer researchers in the post-coup era of the Former Soviet Union [hereafter referred to as the FSU]: (1) ethnic relations; (2) consumer satisfaction; and (3) private entrepreneurship. Ethnic relations C an ancient source of instability between the 128 ethnic nationalities of the FSU (e.g., Lenin 1917) C are becoming ever more chaotic as the 15 nation-states of the FSU continue to disintegrate in the post-coup era (e.g., Franklin 1992; Krupnik 1991; Shevardnadze 1992). Consumer satisfaction remains an oxymoronic term, as consumer dissatisfaction is the norm in the FSU, not the exception, as widely-publicized throughout the Cold War era (e.g., Bonnell 1989; Heller and Nekrich 1986; Kaiser 1976) and the post-coup era (e.g., Antonian 1992; Khubulava 1992; Soloviev 1992). Entrepreneurship, a reform measure introduced by the Gorbachev administration, has failed to live up to both Western and Soviet expectations (e.g., Lewin 1991; Markov 1992; Piyacheva 1992). We investigate these three subjects C ethnic relations, consumer satisfaction, and entrepreneurship C using contemporary literature and personal observations in the FSU before, during, and after the August 1991 coup. We describe consumer and market conditions in the FSU, contradictory goals of the 15 nations-states, and possible hybrid outcomes of these goals on marketization and democratization.

SOCIAL STABILITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL

In order to provide the framework for the remainder of our paper, we begin by defining Social Stability and Social Control. We define Social Stability as "the actual observance of governmentally-formalized, regulated and enforced laws, rules, and norms for societal relations." This could be quantified as the ratio of the number of actual observances of governmentally-formalized, regulated, and enforced laws, rules and norms for social relations to the total number relevant to societal relations. In other words, a high-stability society is one in which a large number of governmentally-formalized, regulated, and enforced laws, rules, and norms are observed. Likewise, a less stable society is one in which a small or non-existant percentage of governmentally-formalized, regulated, and enforced laws, rules, and norms are observed.

Figure One, next page, describes the structure of FSU society in general terms. GOV refers to government, and governmentally-formalized, regulated, and enforced laws, rules, and norms for societal relations. A, B, C, and D are individuals, groups, organizations, and corporations; in essence, all of society which is not part of government. U, V, W, X, Y, and Z refer to the societal relations between individuals, groups, organizations, and corporations. The government is thought to influence societal relations, and vice-versa.

We define Social Control as "the formalization and regulation of societal relations (this includes relations between individuals, groups, and businesses), which are realized through the creation and enforcement of governmental laws, rules and norms." This could be quantified as the ratio of the number of formalized, regulated, and enforced governmental laws, rules, and norms concerning societal relations relative to the total number of societal relations. Therefore, a very controlled society is one in which the majority of social relations are formalized, regulated, and enforced through governmental laws, rules, and norms. Likewise, a relatively less-controlled society is one in which few, or no, social relations are formalized, regulated, and enforced via governmental laws, rules, and norms.

Given our preceeding framework and definitions, we now discuss ethnic relations, consumer satisfaction, and entrepreneurship in the FSU.

ETHNIC RELATIONS

We begin our discussion by noting that the FSU currently is in a state of chaotic, crisis-level disintegration C economically, politically, and ethnically (DeBardelelben 1992; Draper 1991; Prybyla 1992). Franklin (1992) comments that 20 of the 23 borders between the 15 republics of the FSU are being disputed: In fact, recent research at the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Geography found only 3 undisputed borders C those between Belorus and Russia, Belorus and Latvia, and Latvia and Lithuania. There were 160 border disputes in the FSU as of December 1991, and more than 90 border changes have occurred in the USSR since 1921 (Franklin 1992). Of the 128 ethnic groups in the FSU, 109 live primarily in Russia alone.

Resolution of this oft-mentioned "National Problem" (e.g., Gurevich 1991; Krupnik 1991; Lenin 1917) will be a major determinant of the future of the FSU; and thus, the consumer and market futures of the FSU. "Nationalism," as defined in the USSR, was meant to force ethnic groups to conform with one another (e.g., Arutyunov 1990; Bromley 1989; Gellner 1983). From the Tsarist era to the Stalin era, borders were forcibly altered and tribes were removed from their homelands; almost at whim. During the Soviet period, ethnic divisiveness and diversity were suppressed under Communist power. Then, during the Gorbachev period, perestroika and glasnost' led to an unexpected outcome C the unleashing of bitter national conflicts which had been fermenting for centuries. Now, following the downfall of Gorbachev, some of these long-silenced ethnic/national problems are developing into outright wars (Franklin 1992); threatening the people of the FSU, lowering production, and deterring Western businesses from venturing East.

The 128 nationalities of the FSU are spread among 15 SSRs (Soviet Socialist Republics, such as Uzbekistan), 15 ASSRs (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, such as Tatarstan), 8 AOs (Autonomous Regions, like Nagorno-Karabakh), and 4 NOs (National Regions, such as Koriak); many of which want to split off from the FSU (Mackenzie and Curran 1992, see Map One). These include the Chuckchi ASSR (the ethnic group that traversed the Bering Straits via land bridge into Alaska), the Yakut ASSR (in northeastern Siberia), the Tatar ASSR (in European Russia, which now is the independent nation of Tatarstan), the Chuvash ASSR on the North Volga), the Buriat ASSR (of Mongolian ancestry), and many others (Sullivan 1992).

FIGURE 1

THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY IN THE FSU

Recently, there have been at least seven explanations for the independent national movements in the FSU (Krupnik 1991): (1) Extremism; (2) Food Shortages; (3) Political Deformation; (4) Natural Disintegration of the Russian Empire; (5) Feedback Violence; (6) Violations of Guarantees of Sovereign Nationalities; and (7) Theories that Soviet Industrialization of the 20th Century is Out-Dated for the 21st Century. The first explanation for ethnic and national conflicts, Extremism, is reminiscent of old Communist propaganda, in that it blames current strife on radicals-corrupt mafia, enemies of perestroika, ideological enemies, Foreign Secret Service Agents, and/or bureaucrats and apparatchiks C all of whom are thought to be organizing large demonstrations to persuade the masses to panic unnecessarily. The second explanation, Food Shortages, blames national tensions on the economy's inability to meet the people's current food requirements. The third explanation, Political Deformation, is a political/historical explanation which blames the failure of the Union Treaty and the Commonwealth of Independent States on distortions of Stalinist suppression/oppression of ethnic groups during the 1920s to 1930s. This theory notes that if the difficulties had been resolved in the past, attempts to form a new balance between the center and the sovereign republics might succeed. The fourth explanation for nationalistic movements is based on an evolutionary theory, "Natural" Disintegration of the Russian Empire, which argues that the founding of the Soviet Union was a violation of the goals of the Bolshevik Revolution, in that Lenin and Stalin reinstated a single nation along the frontiers of the former Tsarist empire. This political and historical argument is accurate, in that both Lenin and Stalin opposed Federalism prior to the Revolutions of 1917, then radically reversed their positions by 1918 (Lenin 1917; Stalin 1953). The fifth explanation for ethnic unrest, Feedback Violence, is a contemporary sociological/cultural theory which says that the disintegration of multinational empires increases nationalistic movements because empires tend to degrade ethnic traditions, religions, and languages. This theory implies that efforts to return to a single nation (such as the CIS) will increase, rather than decrease national oppression in the FSU (Gellner 1983). Violations of Guarantees of Sovereign Nationality, the sixth explanation, is a psychological theory which states that past violations of national sovereignty will lead to more aggressive nationalism in order to acquire revenge (Gellner 1983). The seventh explanation, Beliefs that Soviet Industrialization from the 20th-Century is Out-Dated for the 21st Century, is a historical argument based on the former failures of all great empires (e.g., Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Persian). This theory claims that all multi-ethnic empires eventually must return to smaller, more manageable entities.

Figure Two, next page, illustrates our theoretical conceptualization of four potential hybrid ethnic outcomes of the balance of Social Stability and Control: (1) Ethnic Cooperation; (2) Ethnic Competition; (3) Ethnic Warring; and (4) Ethnic Suppression/Exploitation. One feature of our conceptualization which should be pointed out is that we limit our discussion to the 15 nations-states of the FSU rather than the 128 ethnic groups living in the FSU. A more complete conceptualization is beyond the scope of this paper. Another facet of our framework which must be considered is whether the 15 former republics of the USSR represent nation-states or ethnic groups. We believe they are nation-states; however, this is not a universally-shared opinion. The third, and perhaps most unsettling feature of our framework which must be noted, is our inability to place any nation-states in the Ethnic Cooperation quadrant.

Indeed, it is possible to locate all 15 nations of the FSU in the Ethnic Warring quadrant; particularly if minor armed conflicts and interpersonal crimes are considered. We place most republics of the FSU in the third quadrant, Ethnic Warring, because we believe this is the dominant mode of ethnic relations in at least 9 nation-states. Russia, as the "police state," is involved in some ethnic conflicts by invitation C such as Tadzhikistan C but in many cases the opposite is true. In all cases, we emphasize that the FSU is passing through such rapid changes that what is accurate today may be inaccurate tomorrow (Rich 1992).

MAP 1

One of the worst ethnic wars is occurring between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Armenian-Azeri conflict is as savage as the fighting between the Croats and Serbs in Yugoslavia and reminiscent of Lebanon (Mackenzie 1992). The key dispute between Christian Armenia and Islamic Azerbaijan is that Armenia wants to annex the Nagorno-Karabakh AO (an Autonomous Region within the borders of Azerbaijan), which wishes to secede to Armenia on the grounds that the population in Nagorno-Karabakh is overwhelmingly Armenian. As Armenians fight to control the Nagorno-Karabakh AO, Azerbaijan has retaliated by forcibly removing Armenians living in other Azeri regions C especially the Azeri capital, Baku (Mackenzie 1992). This ethnic warring is rooted in religious and territorial differences (e.g., Grunwald 1992; Kaplan 1991; Wilson-Smith 1990), and is unlikely to end soon. Ashot Mancharian, a young Armenian leader remarked in a speech in 1989: "For us there is no turning back." Likewise, Rufat Novrozov (1990), an Azeri economist, said: "This fight over territory has become a fight for our worth...our dignity as a people [and] as a nation" (Smith 1991).

Another major conflict in the Transcaucasus is occurring in Georgia, where Islamic Ossetians want to secede from Christian Georgians. Although the war is tied to religious ideologies, it is more than a mere religious revival (Chelyshev 1991). It is a territorial dispute involving the restoration of a whole complex of cultural values. Georgia, perhaps best known as the birthplace of Stalin, and oft-misrepresented in Russian literature as a nation of quasi-Islamic character, oriental background, and unchecked cruelty (Layton 1992), has renewed hopes for peaceful solutions now that Eduard Shevardnadze has assumed its presidency. Yet, the Moscow-imposed state of emergency (The Salt Lake Tribune, November 3, 1992), in combination with the recent legalization of rifles and tear-gas guns for all citizens, indicates that an all-out war with North and South Ossetia is growing ever more feasible (The Salt Lake Tribune, November 12, 1992).

Another key conflict is occurring in Moldavia, a small nation-state located between Ukraine and Romania (Franklin 1992). Moldavia is trying to reunite with Romania, which could lead to a flare-up of violence over Northern Bucovina, which used to be part of Romania, but which Stalin gave to Ukraine when Soviet Moldavia was formed from what used to be Bessarabia. Romania wants Moldavia back, which could fuel Romanian nationalism; and this in turn, could elevate tensions with a Hungarian minority in Transylvania, leading to increased anti-Romanian passion in Hungary proper (Franklin 1992). Ethnic escalation, like nuclear escalation, will threaten Romanian/Ukrainian/European relations and their economic recovery programs.

Ethnic warring also is occurring throughout the Asian nation-states (i.e., Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and sometimes Kazakhstan, but the latter is different because nearly half of its population is Russian). The most recent fighting is happening in Tadzhikistan, where paramilitary forces led by hardliners are attempting to overthrow a democratic government in the capital of Dushanbe (The Salt Lake Tribune, November 7, 1992). In spite of the lack of international media attention, estimates of the number of refugees from the Asian nation-states range well into the millions. 200,000 Tadzhiki refugees were driven from their homes during the same time period that most United States newspapers focused on 16,000 refugees in Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina (The Salt Lake Tribune, November 13, 1992). Media disinterest may imply that the Asian nations have been "written off" as market prospects (at least by Westerners).

FIGURE 2

SOCIAL CONTROL VERSUS SOCIAL STABILITY: HYBRID OUTCOMES AND THNIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 15 NATION-STATES OF THE FSU

If we limit the Ethnic Warring quadrant to nations which are experiencing relatively continuous warring between opposing military forces, then we believe Belorus and Kazakhstan should be put in the second quadrant, Ethnic Competition, since neither nation is engaging in any military action at present (Iwanow 1992).

In contrast, the dominant mode of ethnic relations in both the Baltics and Ukraine is Ethnic Suppression/Exploitation of Russian nationals (e.g., Karaganov 1992; Rudenshiold 1992; Uibopuu 1992). Fierce nationalism in the Baltic States and Ukraine is a threat to Russia, and it is unclear if Russia will permit these nation-states to maintain their sovereignty (e.g., Ellsberg 1992; Kozyrev 1992; Wan-Chin 1992) C particularly if Yeltsin loses his grasp on Russian leadership. However, it also is unclear if Russia is able to control these breakaway nations.

For example, given the recent announcement by Ukraine that it plans to keep (rather than destroy) its nuclear missile silos C which violates the 1991 START treaty C it is becoming increasingly obvious that Ukraine does not trust Russia, and that their relationship is deteriorating (The Salt Lake Tribune November 1, 1992). Russia and Ukraine are contesting ownership of not only nuclear missile silos in Ukraine, but also the Black Sea Naval Fleet and its multi-ethnic crew, as well as the Crimea (e.g., Eberle 1992; Subtelny 1988).

Such disputes over territory are a predictable part of national movements. For example, Lenin (1917) claimed that the 4 criteria of national identification are: (1) territory; (2) language; (3) culture (e.g., customs, values, beliefs); and (4) economy (e.g., the division of productive resources). As such, Ukrainian efforts to retain territory in the Crimea (Franklin 1992), restore the Ukrainian language by renaming Ukrainian cities, revitalize culture by recovering Ukrainian artifacts from Russian museums, and take control of the economy by switching from Russian rubles to Ukrainian currency represent predictable manuevers to recover national identity.

The Ukrainian situation is merely one example of a general trend among the 15 republics of the FSU. All of the ethnic groups of the FSU are C to a greater or lesser extent C establishing unique national identities. While some of these movements represent governmental push (rather than individual pull) strategies, Ukrainian independence is first and foremost an individual (grassroots) movement, and is seen in the changing value-systems, attitudes, behaviors, and possessions of individual Ukrainians.

While consumer researchers traditionally regard ethnicity and nationality only as a means of market segmentation, ethnic and national tensions in the FSU may explain much of the economic regression now occurring within and between the nation-states of the FSU (Alekseev 1991). It is vital to remember that "Russian Dominance" and "Neo-Russian Dominance" represent the central paradigms which have prevailed through the histories of both the Russian and Soviet empires (Mackenzie and Curran 1991). While ethnic pluralism is the purported goal of most political parties currently vying for control of the above nation-states (Frank 1992), the hard reality is that a return to a socialist/centralized/authoritarian state is possible (e.g., Marxist-Leninist League 1992; Smirnov 1991; Zinov'ev 1991).

CONSUMER SATISFACTION

Landy (1991, p. 17) writes: "Virtually all major Western analysts seem to agree that the [Former] Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should make a rapid leap from a disintegrating party-state command economy into one based on a free market and private property." Although this method rarely is questioned by Westerners, Landy goes on to state that Western advice does not match FSU realities. Using examples from Eastern Europe, Landy makes a compelling point that 'shock therapy' has electrocuted the 'patient.' Daniloff (1992, p. 46) gives an example of this:

"'Speech' is cheap in Moscow these days, but food is dear. Prices of most goods have gone up 300% since April, as subsidies have been reduced. And, unless controlled, inflation overall is expected to reach 700% for 1992."

FIGURE 3

SOCIAL CONTROL VERSUS SOCIAL STABILITY HYBRID OUTCOMES ON CONSUMER SATISFACTION

A survey of 4849 Russians in 1991 (World Opinion Update 1992) revealed that 44% of Russians are "Not Very Satisfied" or "Not Satisfied At All" with their Housing Conditions, 64% with Food, 68% with Personal Income, and 69% with Clothing. The survey respondents listed their three top concerns as: (1) Economic Crisis; (2) Rising Crime/Social Disorder; and (3) Danger of War. More recent surveys paint an even bleaker picture (Khubulava 1992).

Two short years ago most Soviet citizens considered themselves to live on an average level; neither poor, nor rich. Now the population may be divided into four disparate groups (Khubulava 1992). The first group consists of people with monthly incomes below 3,500 rubles (nearly half of which live below the poverty line of 1,950 rubles per month). Approximately 36% of the population falls into this category; most of whom are agricultural and industrial workers, scientists, and the so-called cultural elite, such as artists. People in this category are not too far from the homeless in America. While education and medical services are still free, their quality continues to deteriorate, and bribes are necessary to get "Western" service (Ripp 1990). The second group, still lower class, has incomes of 3,500 to 10,000 rubles per month. Remarkably, people in this category spend nearly 80% of their salaries on food. Approximately 34% of the population is in this group; including engineers, doctors, academics, some service workers, and some people involved in commerce. The third group, "the middle class," has incomes of 10,000 to 15,000 rubles per month, but still spend about 40% of their salaries on food. Only 19% of the population fits into this category; primarily people who are working for joint ventures, cooperatives, and private enterprises. The fourth category, "the upper class," has incomes ranging from 15,000 to 45,000 rubles or more per month; about 11% of the population. Most of these people are working for the government or engaged in black market activity or both (as the two go hand-in-hand).

Figure Three, below, diagrams our conceptualization of "relative" consumer satisfaction in the 15 nation-states of the FSU. We place the FSU in the lower right quadrant since, viewed as a whole, the FSU remains high in regard to Social Control and low in respect to Social Stability. The curves represent levels of consumer satisfaction relative to Social Control and Social Stability. The four vectors show differences between the nation-states. Interpretation of our graph shows that the Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) are the most balanced in terms of Social Control and Social Stability, and have the highest levels of consumer satisfaction. The Slavic nations (Belorus, Russia, Ukraine) have higher levels of Social Control, but lower levels of Social Stability, leading to lower levels of consumer satisfaction. (Kazhakstan, although an Asian nation, is put on this vector because it is highly-industrialized and has a Russian population of almost 50%.) A negative situation is observed in the Transcaucasian nations (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), as well as Moldavia, which have lower levels of Social Control, and thus, lower levels of consumer satisfaction. The worst cases in our framework are in the Asian nations (Kirgiziya, Tazhikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), which have the lowest levels of Social Control and Social Stability; thus, the lowest levels of consumer satisfaction.

A disadvantage in understanding changes over time in consumer satisfaction is the lack of valid data from the Soviet period which can be used to compare and contrast with the present data. Thus, despite our realization that economic indicators reveal downward trends in real GNP and consumers are expressing ever more frustration with rising prices, it is difficult to compare and contrast the present situation with the pre-coup era (e.g., Babosov 1992; Nelson, Babaeva and Babaeva 1992).

ENTREPRENEURSHIP

The most dramatic changes during the Revolutionary era of Russia occurred in the economic sector of society. For several generations following the October Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks and Communists attempted to eradicate private interests in the individual and social consciences of the Soviet people, claiming that capitalism leads to worker exploitation, poverty, social conflict, and war. Therefore, the most typical manifestation of private interest-enterpreneurship-was proclaimed illegal, and existing enterpreneurs were deemed criminals (Trotsky 1932).

The elimination of private economic interest was achieved by a set of laws which had three major objectives: (1) to confiscate and nationalize all private means of production; (2) to support and enrichen government-owned property; and (3) to suppress (by any means) the rebirth of enterpreneurship. Lenin's policy of War Communism and Nationalization eliminated, literally and economically, the top-level domestic and international entrepreneurs in the Soviet Union (MacKenzie and Curran 1991).

Stalin completed the task proclaimed in the Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1848/1968) by expropriating the expropriators. By eliminating the kulaks (well-to-do peasants) and hetmen (high-ranking military officers) and introducing the death penalty for so-called "economic crimes," Stalin eradicated traditional entrepreneurship during the Great Purge (MacKenzie and Curran 1991).

However, entrepreneurial activity did not completely disappear. Instead, it moved to criminal spheres of society, where certain strata of people inclined to violate the law used entrepreneurship as an easy means of making money (e.g., Grossman 1977; MacKenzie and Curran 1991). Surprisingly, the roots of these new forms of criminal entrepreneurship were fertilized by the Bolsheviks themselves by putting kulaks and hetmen in prisons and labor camps with hardcore criminals. These people formed a new class of underground entrepreneurs with a new version of business ethics which, in opposition to previous ethics, were based primarily on violence, murder, blackmail, racketeering, and fraud (Grossman 1977). Thus, the Bolsheviks' main achievement was to force market activities underground; not to eradicate capitalism.

Another important "achievement" of the Bolsheviks in their struggle against entrepreneurship was the formation of mass dependence. As the government became the sole possessor of the means of production and the sole distributor of wealth, Soviet people did not need to take care of themselves anymore. The "unofficial" goal of each individual was not to produce commodities with exchange-values and trade them with other individuals for commodities with use-values (consumption), but rather to abuse distribution channels to obtain values without any production or participation in their creation. Thus, state-imposed, forced dependence led to "distributor entrepreneurship," an illegal form of making money by siphoning goods from distribution channels.

The introduction of cost accounting by Khrushev and Brezhnev formed another type of Soviet entrepreneurship C "supply entrepreneurship." It was not legal, but neither was it criminal. Cost accountants and managers in a deficit economy, whose primary responsibilities were to demonstrate "high levels of achievement," manipulated figures to get more and more aid from the government. This form of entrepreneurship is referred to as the "unreported or unrecorded economy." Most managers who worked in the Soviet command-administrative system participated in this illegal form of entrepreneurship under Soviet power. Now these same people now lead businesses in the aftermath of the Soviet Union (Feige 1987, 1989).

During and following the Gorbachev era, a dramatic reversal from political suppression of traditional entrepreneurship to its promotion began taking place. Nation-states are shifting from total state control to accelerated privatization through the issuance of vouchers, competitive bidding, auctions, and direct sales (e.g., Filatotchev, Buck, and Wright 1992; Rumer 1992; Zamoshkin 1992). Former state enterprises are being privatized as closed corporations, open corporations, joint ventures, and other partnerships (see Filatotchev, Buck, and Wright 1992).

Originally, the objectives of privatization were rather moderate; to help price liberalization through the commercialization of trade, to increase consumer satisfaction through the development of service industries, and to develop small-scale entrepreneurship by relinquishing state control over certain enterprises. However, the results of these first attempts were unsuccessful.

Following the failure of partial privatization, Yeltsin's accelerated plan of privatization was introduced. It is forcible privatization, in much the same manner as Stalin's collectivization was forced upon people. Key features of the new plan are total "voucherization" of the population (each citizen is entitled to a supposedly equal share of the national wealth via possession of negotioable government notes C vouchers), as well as accelerated conversion of state-owned property into private, collective, and corporate ownership (however, industries that form the infrastructure remain centralized/nationalized) (e.g., Filatotchev, Buck, and Wright 1992; Rumer 1992; Zamoshkin 1992).

Yet, these are just the outward manifestations of entrepreneurship. Figure Four, next page, illustrates our vision of the four hybrid economic outcomes in the FSU based on our dimensions of Social Control and Social Stability: (1) Mixed Economy; (2) Western-Style Economy; (3) Early-Market Economy; and (4) Monopolistic Economy.

The first type of economy, Mixed Economy, possesses features of capitalism and socialism. When consumers are not satisfied with private entrepreneurs, they demand more control over their activities C sometimes by nationalizing specific industries. Social Stability is maintained because individual entrepreneurs and corporations still exist. The dominant interests are therefore both governmental and corporate, and the primary expressions of these interests are a combination of national income and long-term profit.

The second type of economy, what we term a Western-Style Economy, is best described as developed capitalism. Few or no industries are controlled by the government, although corporations still must take into account the interests of their shareholders, their employees, the government, other authorities, and the public at large. The dominant interest is the survival of the corporation, and is expressed through long-term profit.

We define the third type of economy, an Early Market Economy, as developing capitalism, although there is no guarantee that such an economy will develop into capitalism. It perhaps is equally likely to develop into socialism. This form of economy typically is found where there are low levels of both Social Control and Social Stability. The dominant interest in this type of economic system is the sole proprietor, and is expressed through short-term profits and minimal investment.

The last type of economic system, a Monopolistic Economy, is dominated by government. Its main expression is national income (GNP). This form of economic system is characterized by relatively high Social Control, butCas observed in efforts to enact this form of economic system in the Soviet Union-Social Stability tends to remain low.

FIGURE 4

SOCIAL CONTROL VERSUS SOCIAL STABILITY: HYBRID OUTCOMES AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Given this conceptualization of economic systems, we now extend Figure Four in Figure Five, next page, which depicts our vision of entrepreneurial opportunities in the 15 nation-states of the FSU. We place the FSU in the lower right quadrant since there is no doubt that the FSU, as a whole, remains centralized, with high Social Control and low Social Stability, despite numerous efforts to accelerate privatization and raise consumer satisfaction.

The four vectors depict differences between the nation-states of the FSU. We believe that the Baltic nations, the Slavic nations, and Kazhakstan have the ability to gravitate toward a Mixed Economy (e.g., Filatotchev, Buck, and Wright 1992; Rumer 1992; Zamoshkin 1992), whereas the Transcaucasian nations, Moldavia, and the Asian nations, all of which are involved in significant Ethnic Warring, are trapped in an Early Market Economy. The latter 8 nation-states are operating at a relatively primitive, corrupt, individualistic level; as might be expected during times of war. To escape this chaos, we contend that these nation-states must find an improved balance between Social Stability and Social Control C a fulcrum point which resolves their ethnic and economic woes.

Regardless of the relative positions of our vectors in Figure Five, it is clear that all 15 nation-states of the FSU face considerable business obstacles. Critical factors confronting new entrepreneurs include the lack of social, legal, political, educational, and other structures to support competitive, regulated, Western-style business operations.

Azrael, Brukoff, and Shkolnikov (1992, p. 324), summarizing and analyzing the RAND Conference on Prospective Migration and Emigration from the Former USSR (held in November 1991), comment that several "participants anticipate that the economic crisis" in the FSU "will deepen and persist...in the foreseeable future given the intractability of the command administrative economic system to reform, the almost complete absence of a market infrastructure, and the shortage of [what may be termed] entrepreneurial skills among 'Soviet' citizens."

Given the preceding assessment, we do not disagree that Figure Five might be overly optimistic. To the contrary, we question whether marketization is able to proceed in the absence of the structures needed to support free markets. Thus far in the post-coup era, it would appear that it cannot.

CONCLUSION

"We shall survive the current crisis if we forget the offenses, intrigues, and contradictions that existed formerly...if we are able to unite for the sake of saving the most sacred thing we possess."

Eduard Shevardnadze, 1992

Our goal in writing this article is to emphasize that three factors-ethnic relations, consumer satisfaction, and entrepreneurship-are of great importance to consumer researchers in the FSU and Eastern Europe. The euphoria of the fall of the Iron Curtain and Soviet Communism has subsided. The much-heralded shock therapy reforms of Yeltsin and his Eastern European brethren have led to severe ethnic divisiveness, consumer desperation, and widespread business corruption.

It may be time to step back and consider the gravity of the situation now facing the FSU as it struggles to find an ideal balance between Social Stability and Social Control. The peoples of the 15 nations and the 128 ethnic groups in the FSU C long misunderstood by "Western" and Soviet researchers alike (Tishkov 1992) C have contradictory goals. So far, these contradictory and competitive goals have led to economic and social chaos.

On November 4, 1992, the Wednesday after the 42nd president of the United States was elected, The Salt Lake Tribune reported that the first ethnic-related deaths occurred in Russia: "26 Killed in First Ethnic Fighting on Russian Soil." While inaccurate from historical and contemporary points-of-view, this headline, in combination with large numbers of violent deaths throughout the FSU, has led experts to conclude that a real threat to the Russian constitutional system exists; not only in Moscow, but throughout the FSU (The Salt Lake Tribune, November 12, 1992). We wish to emphasize that it is naive to think this is a Soviet problem. Rather, the transition from communism to capitalism is a global problem (Alekseev 1991).

FIGURE 5

SOCIAL CONTROL VERSUS SOCIAL STABILITY: HYBRID OUTCOMES ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP

In this article, we have presented some potential hybrid outcomes of Social Stability and Social Control, but attempted to refrain from offering predictions about the future of ethnic relations, consumer satisfaction, or entrepreneurial opportunities in the FSU. Gorbachev (1988) said: "Perestroika is not manna from heaven. Rather than waiting for it to be brought in from somewhere, it must be developed by the people themselves." Likewise, we suggest that the consumer and market dreams of the peoples of the FSU rest with the people themselves, and may be tied to overcoming one ancient characteristic of the Russian character which is truly its misfortune C namely, that Russia has never enjoyed a happy present, but instead, periodically changes its dreams of a happy future (Likhachev 1991). The future, we maintain, must be now if there is to be any future at all. [For references, please contact Melissa Martin Young, Department of Marketing, David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, Salt Lake City UT, 84112.]

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