Once? No. Twenty Times? Sure! Uncertainty and Precommitment in Social Dilemmas
Many social dilemmas require interdependent players to protect against a large loss that has a low annual probability. Decisions on whether to invest in protection may be made year by year, or precommitted. We found that increasing the time horizon increases the subjective probability and thus (paradoxically) increases investment rates.
Citation:
David Hardisty, Howard Kunreuther, David Krantz, Poonam Arora, and Amir Sepehri (2018) ,"Once? No. Twenty Times? Sure! Uncertainty and Precommitment in Social Dilemmas", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 46, eds. Andrew Gershoff, Robert Kozinets, and Tiffany White, Duluth, MN : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 583-584.
Authors
David Hardisty, University of British Columbia, Canada
Howard Kunreuther, University of Pennsylvania, USA
David Krantz, New York University, USA
Poonam Arora, Manhattan College
Amir Sepehri, Western University, Canada
Volume
NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 46 | 2018
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