Competition and Attachment in On-Line Auctions

James E. Heyman, University of California-Berkeley
Yesim Orhun, University of California-Berkeley
Dan Ariely, MIT
EXTENDED ABSTRACT - Ariely and Simonson (2003), among others, argue that bidding in an auction is fundamentally different from buying a product for a fixed price either on or off line. Auctions are dynamic affairs and making decisions this environment could influence how bidders come to understand how they value items. Moreover, auctions present their participants with a task of setting the dollar amount they are willing to pay, which differs from deciding whether to buy at a known price. Evidence supporting the influences of these unique features of online auctions has shown that winning prices are positively related to the total number of bids and to the total number of bidders.
[ to cite ]:
James E. Heyman, Yesim Orhun, and Dan Ariely (2005) ,"Competition and Attachment in On-Line Auctions", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 32, eds. Geeta Menon and Akshay R. Rao, Duluth, MN : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 195-196.