Limits of the Effects of Advertisement Framing: the Moderating Effects of Prior Knowledge and Involvement

Jean-Charles Chebat, HEC-Montreal
Frantois Limoges, SAINE-Marketing
Claire GTlinas-Chebat, UQAM
ABSTRACT - Is advertisement framing a peripheral cue? Does consumers’ prior knowledge of the advertised service cancel the effects of the advertisement framing? In order to answer these questions, a 2 (positive-vs.-negative framing) by 2 (low-vs.-high involvement) factorial design (N=117) was performed to assess the combined effects of framing and involvement attitudes( prior knowledge of the advertised service and involvement profile were assessed. Results show that framing affects attitudes mainly when consumers are under low involvement. High prior knowledge cancels the effects of framing whereas low prior knowledge enhances them. It is reasoned that framing is an peripheral cue which triggers cognitive processes on the peripheral route but cannot compensate for the lack of long-term involvement in the product or the lack of prior knowledge. Results are interpreted in terms of the averaging model of information integration and previous results by Levin and Gaeth (1988) and Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990).
[ to cite ]:
Jean-Charles Chebat, Frantois Limoges, and Claire GTlinas-Chebat (1998) ,"Limits of the Effects of Advertisement Framing: the Moderating Effects of Prior Knowledge and Involvement", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 25, eds. Joseph W. Alba & J. Wesley Hutchinson, Provo, UT : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 324-333.

Advances in Consumer Research Volume 25, 1998      Pages 324-333

LIMITS OF THE EFFECTS OF ADVERTISEMENT FRAMING: THE MODERATING EFFECTS OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND INVOLVEMENT

Jean-Charles Chebat, HEC-Montreal

Frantois Limoges, SAINE-Marketing

Claire GTlinas-Chebat, UQAM

ABSTRACT -

Is advertisement framing a peripheral cue? Does consumers’ prior knowledge of the advertised service cancel the effects of the advertisement framing? In order to answer these questions, a 2 (positive-vs.-negative framing) by 2 (low-vs.-high involvement) factorial design (N=117) was performed to assess the combined effects of framing and involvement attitudes( prior knowledge of the advertised service and involvement profile were assessed. Results show that framing affects attitudes mainly when consumers are under low involvement. High prior knowledge cancels the effects of framing whereas low prior knowledge enhances them. It is reasoned that framing is an peripheral cue which triggers cognitive processes on the peripheral route but cannot compensate for the lack of long-term involvement in the product or the lack of prior knowledge. Results are interpreted in terms of the averaging model of information integration and previous results by Levin and Gaeth (1988) and Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990).

LIMITS OF THE EFFECTS OF ADVERTISEMENT FRAMING

IS MESSAGE FRAMING A PERIPHERAL CUE?

The Potential Interplay of Involvement and Prior Knowledge on the Persuasive Effects of Messge Framing: The interplay of involvement and prior knowledge is analyzed here as moderating the persuasive effects of message framing. The following example shows how they may interplay. When first personal computers were marketed, Apple computers were evaluated superior to IBM counterparts. Paradoxically, Apple sold much less than IBM, which it was regarded as a "safe" choice. However, as customers learned more about computers, they feared less the negative outcomes of their decisions (so called "downside risk"). The information was first framed negatively so that customers tended to overweigh the negative consequences of a risky purchase then they could accumulate enough information to cancel the effects of the downside risk.

The persuasive effects of message framing have been shown to be moderated by involvement or product prior knowledge. The present study focuses on the individual and interactive effects of these two potential moderators. On one hand, high prior knowledge may be reasoned to be related to high involvement in the sense that consumers interested in a product are more likely to know more of the product sufficiently to feel involved in the product: the interest in it leads consumer to search for more information. On the other hand, one may also reason that the perceived risk involved with a product is higher for less knowledgeable consumers. The following literature review shows how each of the two moderators, involvement and prior knowledge, affect the persuasive effects of message framing.

Why would consumers prefer to buy meat advertised as "75% lean "rather than advertised "25% fat", whereas the two messages are logically identical? The prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) has opened avenues of research to understand the persuasive effects of positively-vs.-negatively-framed messages. However, the existing literature does not offer convergent results. Some studies show that a positive framing produces significant effects (Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Levin, Johnson, Deldin, Carstens, Cressey & Davis, 1986; Levin, Johnson, Russo & Deldin, 1985; Levin, Schnittjer & Thee, 1988); others show mixed results (Woodside & Singer, 1994; Homer & Yoon, 1992; Mizerski, 1982) or no effects at all (Fagley & Miller, 1987).

Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) propose a theoretical explanation for the mixed results of previous studies. On the basis of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) by Petty and Cacioppo (1979,1981, 1986), they suggest that the framing effects depends on the consumers’ involvement; negative framing is more efficient under high involvement, positive framing under low involvement.

Another study sheds light on the moderator role of involvement. Woodside and Singer (1994) show that the effects of framing are significant only when subjects were not in social interaction, because social interaction pushes consumers’ choices toward a high-involvement buying problem where commitment is important. These recent findings confirm the classical study by Levin (1987) who found that individuals make favorable-vs.-unfavorable associations according to the positive-vs.-negative orientation given to the attributes of a product (i.e. meat presented as being 75% lean-vs.-25% fat).

In this famous study, the framing of the message is an artifact used as a way of making an assessment of the product without really assessing the arguments related to the product. In other words, framing cues are used on a peripheral route (i.e. low involvement condition) of the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1982), or as a heuristic strategy of the HSM (Chaiken, 1980). Attitudinal changes occur because consumers make simple inferences about the merits of the product based on formal cues [Under low involvement, consumers process information as "cognitive misers" and focus on the executional cues, such as the spokesperson's physical appearance.] (Chaiken, 1980; MacInnis, Moorman & Jaworski, 1991; MacInnis & Jaworski, 1989; Petty, Cacioppo & Schumann, 1983).

However important and convincing the results by Levin (1987) may be, they are in contradiction with (at least) two studies by Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) and Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987). Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) showe that negative framing effects on attitudes are more significant under high involvement. Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) found that women participating in their study on breast self-examination (a high involvement topic) were more convinced when exposed to a negatively framed message (benefits lost) than when exposed to the positively framed message (benefits gained).

Briefly stated while Woodside and Singer (1994) and Levin (1987) found that framing has significant impact on attitudes only under high involvement, Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) and Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) found that the effects are significant under both high and low involvement.

A second level of ambiguity stems from the effects of prior knowledge, which, as shown below, moderates the impact of framing on attitudes.

The Role of Prior Knowledge

Levin and Gaeth (1988) replicated Levin’s (1987) study on the beef with one additional variable: the product trial (i.e. prior knowledge). They were prompted to use prior knowledge of the product by the study of by Hoch and Ha (1986), which, as stated by Levin and Gaeth (1988), " suggests that framing effects will be strongest when the product experience is nondiagnostic (ambiguous) and will be weakest (or overwhelmed) when the product experience is diagnostic (unambiguous) ". The try out was used as a way to collect information, which would later be retrieved and used as prior knowledge, in the processing of the framed message information. Levin and Gaeth (1988) found "the magnitude of the framing effect (...) was related to whether subjects actually tasted the ground beef (...) " (p.376) and that " the general reduction of the framing effect (...) occurs when consumers actually sampled the product " (p.377). They interpret their results in the following terms: "Our results are (...) consistent with those of Hoch and Ha (1986) who found that ads (frames) have an effect on the subsequent product evaluation only when the product experience is ambiguous " (p.377).

Following Hoch and Ha (1986) and Levin and Gaeth (1988 ), we hypothesize (see H2 in the hypotheses section below) that the framing effects are strongest when consumers lack sufficient prior knowledge (i.e. the product experience is "ambiguous") and weakest when the product experience is unambiguous.

Interactive Effects of Prior Knowledge and Involvement

The literature reviews leads to some convergent conclusions:

- following both Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) on one hand, and Levin and Gaeth (1988) and Hoch and Ha (1986) on the other hand, one may hypothesize that under both low involvement and low prior knowledge, consumers are likely to generate favorable attitudes toward positively framed messages;

- following the same authors, one may also hypothesize that under low prior knowledge and high involvement, consumers are likely to generate better attitudes toward negatively framed advertisements; however the status of framing cannot be that of a "peripheral cue ", which remains to be explored in the present research.

But there is no possible convergence between these authors in the following case: what happens if consumers are not knowledgeable of the advertised product and involved in it ? On one hand, the effects of positive-vs.-negative framing are reduced by consumers’ high prior knowledge (Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Hoch & Ha, 1986). On the other hand, Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) propose that the effects of framing are also significant for consumers under high involvement.

Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) suggest that when under high involvement, "people assigned it (i.e. negatively framed information) a greater weight and viewed it as more persuasive " and " overweight negative informatio " (p. 366). This reasoning causes two problems. The first problem is related to the very status of the framing: negatively framed information does not contain more (or less) information than positively framed information. Then why is it more deeply processed when under high involvement ?

The second problem with this reasoning is that the results by Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) are hardly compatible with those by Levin and Gaeth (1988) and Hoch and Ha (1986), who show that the effects of framing are reduced significantly by high prior knowledge of the product. If consumers are knowledgeable of the product, they rely less on the executional cue (such as the framing) and more on the arguments per se. Following Cacioppo and Petty (1986), we reason that "simple cues and decision rules are more likely to affect susceptibility to influence when prior knowledge is low" (p. 165). We propose that message framing may trigger what Cacioppo and Petty call a "biased elaboration", that is "a variable either motivates or enables people to generate a particular kind of thought (favorable or unfavorable) in response to a message or inhibits particular thoughts" (p. 19). Two studies deserve special attention as they are showing respectively the effects of prior knowledge and involvement on the biased elaboration. First, individuals exposed to a long message on a topic of which they are little knowledgeable show better attitudes than those exposed to a short message: these effects are canceled in the case of highly knowledgeable individuals (Wood, Kalgreen and Priesler, 1985). Second, low involved consumers’ attitudes are enhanced by messages including a higher number of arguments; these effects are also canceled under high involvement (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984).

At least in the case of message framing, no study so far has shown the interactive effects of involvement and prior knowledge on attitude change. However, the "average model of integration information" confirmed by Levin and Goeth’s findings (1988) may help us predict what these effects may be. They point out that " the weight of a given piece of information decreases as the number of pieces (...) increases. Thus the greater the number of prior personal experiences with a product, the less should be the effect of subsequent attribute labeling " (p.378). Moreover, they suggest as future research that " even a powerful positive frame will (unlikely) lead to favorable evaluation " if consumers know well from their own personal experience that the product is bad. In other words, prior knowledge may not only reduce but simply cancel the effects of framing if the prior knowledge is strongly entrenched in the consumer’s personal experience. We then suggest that under the combined effects of high prior knowledge and high involvement, the effects are canceled.

HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses are derived from the literature review and focus on the moderating effects of involvement and prior knowledge. Framing has been shown to impact on the cognitive aspects of persuasion, not on the affective counterparts. We shall then analyze separately the cognitive vs. affective components of the attitudes in order to assess which components is more significantly affected by the message framing. However, we shall not split each of the following five hypotheses, which would make them excessively intricate.

H1: a. Under high involvement, a negatively framed message generates better attitudes toward the message and the product than a positively framed message.

b. Under low involvement, a positively framed message generates better attitudes toward the message and the product than a negatively framed message.

H2: a. Under high prior knowledge, a negatively framed message does not generate better attitudes toward the message and the product than a positively framed message.

b. Under low prior knowledge the effects of framing on the attitude toward the message and the product are significant.

H3: High prior knowledge cancels the two-way effects of framing and involvement on the attitudes toward the message and the product.

METHOD

Overview

This experiment is based on a 2 (levels of involvement) by 2 (positive-vs.-negative framing) factorial design. One advertisement was designed for each of the four experimental conditions: the dichotomous experimental approach to issue involvement aims at generating variance between experimental groups. However each subject’s involvement is assessed in a multidimensional and continuous way through the Laurent-Kapferer (1985) involvement profile scales. While the basic arguments of the advertisements (inspired by real advertisements issued by a major bank) remain the same in both version, the advocacy is formulated differently.

The positively framed message stressed the advantages of using the financial service advertised by the banks, such as: " it is pleasant to have money available when needed "; " the (service) puts you in a strong financial situation in case you need it ". The negatively framed message stressed the drawbacks of not using the service, such as: " it is unpleasant not to have money available when needed ", " if you use the (service), you are in a position of weakness if you need the money ", etc.

We wanted to make sure that the negatively and positively framed messages are of similar linguistic complexity, so that the variance of our results may not be attributed to the different wording of the messages. The negatively framed message was slightly longer but the two messages remain quite similar, in terms of numbers of words (163-vs.-168), average word length (4.7-vs.-4.8), average sentence length (26.3-vs.-26.6 words), Gunning legibility index (12.9-vs.-13.8), number of propositions (24-vs.-23). In both ads, the same (mock) bank name was used.

The issue involvement was manipulated by using two financial services: an advertisement on ATM-vs.-an advertisement on students’ loans. In a pre-test, the Zaichkowski (1985) PII scores had already been proven to be significantly different (t=4.09; p<.001) (GTlinas-Chebat and Chebat, 1991).

Each of the four experimental advertisements was presented to the respondents as an 8_( by 14( page from a major business magazine. On the left side of the page, an article on local economic development is printed whereas the right side is used for the advertisement.

Each folio (including the advertisement and the article) was inserted into its corresponding questionnaire, either pertaining to student loans or to ATM cards. Both questionnaires are similar in all aspects, with the exception of the reference to the advertised financial service (loan-vs.-ATM card) and the (positive-vs.-negative) framing. The questionnaire included the following sequence of scales: attitudes toward the advertisement, the service, the intent to buy it and the Laurent-Kapferer "involvement profile". The documents were randomly distributed to 117 students during introductory courses of the administration undergraduate program. Age varied from 19 to 52. They were randomly assigned to each of the four experimental conditions: 112 provided us with usable questionnaires. The students were invited to read the page of the magazine as if they were reading at home, so that the respondents do not pay more attention to the advertisement than they normally would in an actual context. In addition, we did not want the students to be tempted to voluntarily memorize certain elements of the article or of the advertisement. The respondents were allotted 3 minutes to be exposed to the page of the magazine and were not allowed to go back to the advertisement when the questionnaire was administered.

Measurement of Attitudes

The questionnaire, already used and tested in a previous study (GTlinas-Chebat and Chebat, 1991) included measures of attitudes toward the message and the service and the intent to buy. The attitudes were divided into two sub-categories, that is cognitive and affective dimensions. A factor analysis was used to confirm the structure. It showed two factors for the Aad construct (one for the cognitiv dimension, the other for the affective dimension, the explained variances of which were respectively 44% and 11%), two factors for the Abd construct (cognitive and affective dimensions, the explained variances of which were 60% and 13%) and one for the intent to buy. All eigenvalues are superior to 1. The respective Cronbach’s alphas are: .82, .76, .84, .64, and .81.

Involvement Profile

Laurent and Kapferer’s (1985) scale is made up of 16 items: it represents the five dimensions of involvement. We adapted the statements of their scale to match the studied services (a student loan and a personal touch banking card).

The respondents had to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with each of the 16 statements according to the Likert scale in 5 points. A factor analysis with an OBLIMIN rotation (which replicates the procedure by Laurent and Kapferer, 1985) shows five factors: hedonic value (19% of the explained variance), sign (17%), risk probability (12%), risk importance (8%), and importance of the product (7%).

Prior knowledge of the service

Prior knowledge of the advertised service is measured with two 7-point Likert scales (level of general knowledge of the product, level of knowledge regarding the characteristics of the products) from -3 to +3. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for this scale is 0.80 (average score=-1.51 ; standard deviation=3.15). Interestingly, prior knowledge is not related to four of the five factors of involvement described above (p<.30), only to risk probability (R2=.10; p<.01). However it is significantly higher for the ATM (0.01) than for the student loan (-3.14): F1,111= 37; p<.000.

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks

A series of five ANOVA’ s on the Laurent-Kapferer’ involvement profile five factors were performed to verify if the involvement manipulation was successful. The five factor scores were significantly different in the two experimental conditions (respectively: F1,109=18.33, 6.22, 4.32, 5.53, and 2.92; p=.000, .014, .042, .022 and .09); in all cases a higher score was found for the student loan than for the ATM card, which shows that the manipulation was successful.

Hypotheses Testing

H1: interactive effects of framing and involvement. A series of ANOVA’s were performed to test the effects of the framing and the (manipulated) involvement (i.e. ATM card-vs.-loan). A significant interaction was found on the three following attitudes: the cognitive dimension of Aad (F1,109=5.46; p=0,021), the behavioral intention (F1,111=5.68; p=0.01) and the cognitive dimension of Abd (F1,108=3.58; p=0.06). Under high involvement, framing has no impact on these attitudes (except a marginal impact on the intent to buy: F1,55=2.80; p=0.10). H1a is rejected. Under low involvement, on the contrary, message framing has significant effects on the cognitive dimension of Aad (F1,54=8,64; p=0.01) and the cognitive dimension of Abd (F1,54=4.91; p=0.03), and marginally on the intent to buy (F1,56=2.90; p=0.094). In all three cases, under low involvement, positive framing was associated with better attitudes (F1,50=8.63, 4.91 and 3.09; p=.005, .031 and .08 respectively). H1b is supported. The results are shown in Figures 1a, 1b and 1c.

H2: interactive effects of framing and prior knowledge. A MANOVA was performed. Itsdependent variables were the attitudinal factor scores, and its independent variables were the framing and the (dichotomized) prior knowledge scores. It shows significant two-way effects of the independent variables on the cognitive dimensions of the attitudes toward the advertisement and the brand, and on the intent to buy (respectively F1,98=5.63; p=.02; F1,98=10.42; p=.002; F1,98=9.66; p=.002). Further individual ANOVA’s, where the dependent variable is each of these three variables, show significant interactions (respectively F1,104=3.952; p=.049; F1,103=7.17; p=.009; F1,106=12.64; p=.004). More precisely, in the three cases, under low prior knowledge, framing has significant effects on attitudes (respectively F1,48=6.85; p=.012; F1,49=6.6; p=.013; F1,51=7.61; p=.008); in the three cases, positive framing is associated with better attitudes. See Figures 2a, 2b and 2c summarizing the effects of framing and prior knowledge respectively on Aad and Abd and the intent to buy. However, under high prior knowledge, the effects of framing are not significant (respectively F1,56=0.01; p=.98; F1,55=1.22; p=.27; F1,55=.225; p=.64). H2a and H2b are supported.

H3: interactive effects of prior knowledge and involvement. A MANOVA was performed. Its dependent variables were Aad and Abd and the intent to buy, and its independent variables were framing, (manipulated) involvement and (dichotomized) prior knowledge. It shows significant three-way effects (F3,109=3.53; p=0.02). The three-way effects are significant on each of the three dependent variables (respectively: F1,101=6.23; p=0.01; F1,101=5.07; p=0.03; F1,101=5.99; p=0.01). A series of ANOVA’s shows that, for each of the dependent variables, the two-way effects of framing and involvement are significant only under low prior knowledge, whereas they are not under high prior knowledge. See figures 3a, 3b and 3c and 3a’, 3b’ and 3c’ summarizing the effects of framing on Aad and Abd and the intent to buy, under low and high prior knowledge respectively. Table 1 summarizes the six ANOVA’s performed on the three dependent variables under low-vs.-high prior knowledge. H3 is supported.

DISCUSSION

Message framing impacts only on the cognitive dimensions of attitudes toward the message and the service, which contributes to understand better the effects of framing as limited to cognitive processes. Our findings confirm those by Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987): under high involvement, negatively framed messages enhance behavioral intent. They also confirm and complement those by Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990). Positive framing generates better scores of intent to buy under low involvement and conversely negative framing generates better scores under high involvement. Since Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) focused on the behavioral intent and did not measure the attitudes toward the message and toward the brand, we can hardly compare our results with theirs on these scores. However, our findings show that under low involvement, positive framing enhances the attitudes toward the brand (both cognitive and affective dimensions) and under high involvement, the two forms of framing are associated with similar attitudes toward the brand. Our results basically confirm that framing is a rhetorical process, the effects of which are more significant under low involvement.

High prior knowledge cancels the effects of framing: as shown in Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c, framing has significant effects on the attitudes (Aad, Abd and the intent to buy) if the receivers have a low level of knowledge of the advertised service, and that these effects are not significant if consumers are knowledgeable of the advertised serice. These results confirm those of Levin and Gaeth (1988): consumers who can relate the advertisement to their own knowledge of advertised service reach deeper levels of information processing. In fact Levin and Gaeth (1988) found that prior knowledge reduced the effects of framing whereas we found that these effects are canceled. We reason that the prior knowledge of the two services was more deeply entrenched in the consumers’ memory than the ground beef (in the case of Levin and Gaeth, 1988): if consumers know of these services, they are linked to their daily life either by their usage or by their concern to refund the borrowed money. In other words our results confirm these authors intuition that the effects of prior knowledge will cancel *even a powerful (...) frame.

Even more striking is the result that high prior knowledge cancels the combined effects of framing and involvement. In other words, under either high or low involvement, if consumers are knowledgeable of the advertised service, the effects of framing are not significant. High prior knowledge cancels the effects of framing under both high and low involvement. Let us examine both cases. Firstly, when consumers are under high involvement, as already shown, the effects of framing are not significant: high prior knowledge then reinforces the effects of high involvement. Secondly, when under low involvement, consumers use executional cues such as framing to process the message. However, if they are knowledgeable of the advertised service, they may also process the advertisement content. Our findings show that knowledgeable consumers’ process less executional cues (i.e. framing) but cannot show if they process more content.

CONCLUSION

1.Two converging explanations may be offered for the interactive effects of involvement and framing. The first explanation is derived from the idea that the more involved a consumer is, the less attentive to the message he/she is: when under high involvement conditions, as argued by Mandl and Ballstaed (1982), an individual who elaborates intensively may be a distractive message learner: long-term memory processes may be disrupted by deep elaboration. More precisely, when consumers are under high involvement and reach deeper levels of information processing, they allocate less attention to the executional cues when they process their own stored information. Consequently, the effects of framing, as an executional cue, are canceled.

2. The second explanation is derived from the Elaboration Likelihood Model (e.g. Petty and Cacioppo, 1979): message framing is basically an executional cue, the effects of which are significant only when consumers do not process the message’s arguments and use heuristic processes instead.

As for the interactive effects of framing and prior knowledge, it is reasoned that knowledgeable consumers elaborate their response to the advertisements on the basis of their own prior experience with the advertised product. They assess the quality of the advertisement arguments as coherent with their own knowledge, whatever the executional cues of the message. In other words, they focus on the central route of the content and not on the peripheral elements, such as the message framing. High prior knowledge seems to be playing the same role as high involvement: both cancel the effects of framing. These results are also interpreted in terms of the averaging model of information integration: knowledgeable consumers have accumulated a higher number of information pieces; then the relative weight of the last information presented to him/her s all the more reduced. Whether the advertised information is presented positively or negatively has marginal attitudinal effects when consumers are more knowledgeable, as this was the case for personal computers when they became better known.

The present results may also serve as a methodological warning for researchers using experimental factorial designs where involvement is manipulated. Since prior knowledge may moderate the effects of executional cues (such as message framing), researchers using such methods are advised to assess subjects’ prior knowledge in order to avoid confounding effects of involvement and prior knowledge.

FIGURE 1A

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT ON THE (COGNITIVE) AAD

FIGURE 1B

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT ON THE (COGNITIVE) ABD

FIGURE 1C

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT ON THE INTENT TO BUY

FIGURE 2A

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT ON THE (COGNITIVE) AAD

FIGURE 2B

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT ON THE (COGNITIVE) ABD

FIGURE 2C

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT ON THE INTENT TO BUY

FIGURE 3A

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT UNDER LOW PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON AAD

FIGURE 3B

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT UNDER LOW PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON ABD

FIGURE 3C

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT UNDER LOW PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON RECOMMEND

FIGURE 3A'

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT UNDER HIGH PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON AAD

FIGURE 3B'

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT UNDER HIGH PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF ABD

FIGURE 3C'

EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND INVOLVEMENT UNDER HIGH PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON THE BEHAVIORAL INTENT

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF THE 2 WAY EFFECTS OF INVOLVEMENT X FRAMING AND THE THREE DEPENDENT VARIABLES (AAD, ABD, INTENT)

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