Two Wrongs Make a Right? Accidental Consensus in Predictions of Others’ Preferences Under Uncertainty

David Faro, University of Chicago
Katherine Burson, University of Michigan
Yuval Rottenstreich, Duke University

Two Wrongs make a Right? Accidental Consensus in Predictions of

Others’ Preferences under Uncertainty

 

David Faro

University of Chicago

 

Katherine Burson

University of Michigan

 

Yuval Rottenstreich

Duke University

 

To make effective decisions under uncertainty (such as choosing how much to invest in to a competition), people often must accurately predict other people’s decisions. Accuracy may be elusive, however, because of self-other discrepancies at two stages of prediction. First, in the probability judgment stage, people are more influenced by task difficulty than they believe others would be. Second, in the probability weighting stage, people are more influenced by affect than they believe other would be. Interestingly, because these self-other differences work in opposing directions, their combined effects can result in “accidental consensus” between people’s own choices and their predictions of others’ choices.
[ to cite ]:
David Faro, Katherine Burson, and Yuval Rottenstreich (2006) ,"Two Wrongs Make a Right? Accidental Consensus in Predictions of Others’ Preferences Under Uncertainty", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 33, eds. Connie Pechmann and Linda Price, Duluth, MN : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 113-114.