A Field Experiment on the Effectiveness of Uncertain Incentives on Large Magnitude

Luxi Shen, Chinese University of Hong Kong, China
Christopher Hsee, University of Chicago, USA
Joachim Talloen, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
We designed and tested different incentives on a Hong Kong pay-by-task survey platform and found that (a) in terms of entry decisions (preference “in prospect”), certain incentives attracted more workers, and (b) in terms of repetition decisions (performance “in process”), uncertain incentives better maintain the active-worker base.
[ to cite ]:
Luxi Shen, Christopher Hsee, and Joachim Talloen (2017) ,"A Field Experiment on the Effectiveness of Uncertain Incentives on Large Magnitude", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 45, eds. Ayelet Gneezy, Vladas Griskevicius, and Patti Williams, Duluth, MN : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 196-199.