Do Defaults Work When They’Re Disclosed? Effectiveness and Perceived Ethicality of Disclosed Defaults

Ruth Pogacar, University of Cincinnati, USA
Mary Steffel, University of Cincinnati, USA
Elanor Williams, University of California San Diego, USA
Ana Figueras, University of Florida
Defaults nudging people toward desired choices are increasingly common. Critics argue that undisclosed nudges are unethical, but proponents caution disclosure could render defaults ineffective. We show that nudges are effective when disclosed. Additionally, despite seeming less ethical when benefitting business versus society, disclosed defaults are equally effective regardless of beneficiary.
[ to cite ]:
Ruth Pogacar, Mary Steffel, Elanor Williams, and Ana Figueras (2014) ,"Do Defaults Work When They’Re Disclosed? Effectiveness and Perceived Ethicality of Disclosed Defaults", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 42, eds. June Cotte and Stacy Wood, Duluth, MN : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 806-806.