Unconscious Goals and Creativity: Activating Creativity Goals Breaks Established Associations and Leads to the Generation of Original Ideas

Gordon Moskowitz, Lehigh University, USA
Kai Sassenberg, University of Jena, Germany

Goals have associated with them specific mindsets that allow for successful goal pursuit. Conscious goal pursuit, however, can trigger interfering cognitive routines that actually deter successful goal pursuit. Our research illustrates that the priming of goals, in this case the goal to be creative, leads to more efficient goal pursuit. The unconsciously pursued goal to be creative allows for creativity to be achieved by inhibiting established associations that can block creativity. This leads to the generations of new/novel solutions and ideas. Consciously adopting a creativity goal has the opposite effect, with creativity achieved only when implicitly triggered.

[to cite]:

[url]:
http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/12848/volumes/v34/NA-34

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SESSION OVERVIEW

Recent research in social cognition has examined implicit motivation or how goals operate in implicit or nonconscious ways. While some research in this area has examined whether goals can be activated nonconsciously, recent research has examined the complex ways in which both consciously and nonconsciously activated goals influence thought or behaviour through a variety of implicit mechanisms.

The three papers in this session address a number of questions with respect to implicit motivation: Which “mind” leads to more efficient goal pursuit— the conscious or the unconscious? Can the automatic evaluation of a goal predict goal-relevant behaviour better than explicit measures? And finally, in the context of a self-control dilemma, does a positive automatic evaluation of the goal make one more resistant to temptations?

In the first presentation, Gordon Moskowitz and Kai Sassenberg argue that conscious and unconscious goal pursuit may vary in effectiveness. In some cases, conscious goal pursuit may trigger interfering cognitive routines that deter successful goal pursuit which does not occur with unconscious goal pursuit. They demonstrate that conscious goal pursuit of the creativity goal may activate associations that inhibit creativity, while the unconscious pursuit of this goal will inhibit these associations.

Melissa Ferguson suggests that an automatic evaluation toward a goal should reflect a person’s tendency to approach that goal, which in turn should predict goal-consistent behavior. In a series of experiments, she finds that an automatic evaluation of goal constructs (i.e. abstract, desirable end-states) significantly predicts goal-relevant behavior. Interestingly, the automatic evaluations of the goal served as a better predictor of goal consistent behaviour than explicit attitudes, explicitly measured goal commitment, and automatic evaluations of concrete, goal-relevant objects.

In the last presentation, Darlene Walsh and Andrew Mitchell examine automatic goal activation and automatic evaluations on consumption under high and low cognitive load. And rather than focusing on more general temptations and goals, they focus on a specific self-control dilemma among only restrained eaters. They find that only individuals who automatically activate a goal while exposed to a real temptation activate an automatic self-control process. Interestingly, they find no relationship between behaviour and automatic evaluations of the goal. However, they do show that activation of a goal during exposure automatically decreased the positivity of automatic evaluations towards objects not useful in attaining that goal. In other words, although these restrained eaters had an automatic positive evaluation of the temptation before exposure to the temptation, during exposure their automatic evaluation became neutral. Participants who did not automatically activate a diet goal during exposure to the temptation did not have an automatic positive evaluation of the goal; however they did have an automatic positive evaluation of the temptation and there was a relationship between the positivity of the automatic evaluation and consumption.

Taken together, this session should be of interest across a broad range of research areas including self-regulation, automatic evaluation, implicit attitude, goal activation, and automatic goal pursuit. The three papers in this session examine implicit motivation from somewhat different approaches and results converge in some cases, and diverge in others. Given this, the purpose of this session is actually two fold: first, we want to expose consumer behaviour researchers interested in implicit motivation to some recent theoretical approaches used in the area; and second, we want to highlight the differences in the papers in order to resolve what may appear to be inconsistencies, consequently leading to a more complete understanding of the implicit motivation and its effects.

EXTENDED ABSTRACTS

“Unconscious Goals and Creativity: Activating Creativity Goals Breaks Established Associations and Leads to the Generation of Original Ideas”

Gordon B. Moskowitz, Lehigh University
Kai Sassenberg, University of Jena

It is known that the unconscious mind can be smart. People asked to consciously ruminate over important decisions can make worse choices than those simply asked to sleep on it and let the difficult options tumble through the unconscious (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). Can the unconscious mind also be creative? Our research illustrates that creativity goals, and an associated “think different” mindset, operate in the preconscious to produce novel solutions and inhibit old/established associations—people exhibit unconscious creativity.

Being creative implies, by definition, the attempt to avoid the conventional routes of thinking and, therefore, the avoidance of the activation of typical associations. Research on idea generation has painted, however, a fairly bleak picture regarding human ability to consciously pursue the goal of being creative. Despite participants being explicitly instructed to generate new, original ideas, and not to copy any feature of some examples that are provided, participants copy the given examples (or at least certain features of them). If asked to generate a novel and creative name for a new pasta and being provided with sample pasta names (e.g., spaghetti, fettuccini, linguini), people produce something that sounds perfectly non-creative, a blending of the existing names (e.g., fellini). Individuals are not able to control this so-called inadvertent plagiarism intentionally. The conformity to given examples did not decrease when participants were explicitly instructed to create ideas that were very different from the examples, even though they were able to list the features they were asked to avoid (Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993; Marsh, Ward, & Landau, 1999). The plagiarism occurs most likely because examples are highly accessible during idea generation, and this activated knowledge impacts idea generation without awareness (Marsh, Bink, & Hicks, 1999) and thus beyond intentional control.

While these findings point to the fact that thinking differently by conscious intent is difficult, the implicit volition model (IVM; Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk, 2004) suggests that unconscious goals may have greater success. Implicit motivation and preconscious goal pursuit involve processes of goal shielding that occur outside of awareness that are not subject to the pitfalls of conscious intent. As an example, considering the case of creativity goals, facilitation and inhibition processes help to implicitly allow for goal pursuit, by keeping goal-relevant concepts (such as being novel) accessible and keeping goal-competing concepts (such as being typical) inhibited. A mindset to “think different” is triggered by the creativity goal, and this mindset has preconscious effects on cognition that promote goal pursuit, with wide ranging consequences.
In our research it is established that the priming of creativity goals allows participants to overcome inadvertent plagiarism. Moreover, the rebound effect (i.e., higher accessibility of features of the examples after they have been suppressed successfully) is not found after creativity priming. Subsequent research further suggests that typical associations between stimuli and concepts are less likely to be activated after being primed with creativity. This is tested first in the important domain of stereotyping. We expected that the African American stereotype would be less likely to be automatically activated after seeing the face of an African American when people were primed with creativity beforehand (compared to a control condition). The “think different” mindset was shown to break the typical association, thus allowing people to free their thoughts from the shackles of the stereotype. People primed with faces of Africa Americans had stereotypes triggered in control conditions, but not when primed with creativity goals. In another experiment this effect of “inhibiting typical associations” was found to generalize to the underlying phenomenon: the automatic activation of any “typical” associations was reduced by priming creativity. Thus, associations between “bread and butter” and “doctor and nurse” that have been broadly replicated in research paradigms using lexical decision tasks were found to not exist when creativity goals were being unconsciously pursued.

Taken together, being primed with creativity allows for generating original ideas because one is able to think differently without the unwanted side effects of suppressing thoughts triggered by the intention to suppress them. The “thinking different” mindset induced by priming creativity operates by reducing the automatic activation of typical associations, all without the person’s conscious intent or awareness. Importantly, this preconscious goal pursuit allows for the control over automatic stereotype activation. Advantages to this method of stereotype control are that (a) it is a proactive strategy of stereotype control, one that prevents stereotypes from ever coming to mind (as opposed to strategies that require one to suppress the use of stereotypes after the fact or attempt to prevent these activated concepts from biasing one’s judgment; e.g., Devine, 1989), and (b) it is not restricted to preventing the activation of a single stereotype, but most likely undermines the automatic activation of any stereotype and other unwanted thoughts (unlike interventions using the training of new associations, goals and intentions, and developing new expectancies; e.g., Blair & Banaji, 1996; Kawakami et al., 2000; Montefith et al., 2002; Moskowitz et al., 1999, 2000, 2003). The unconscious mind is not only smart, it is an efficient goal pursuer, and thus can be highly creative.

“The Automatic Evaluation of Goals”
Melissa J. Ferguson, Cornell University

Research in social cognition has demonstrated that people immediately and unintentionally evaluate the people, words, pictures, faces, letters, and even odors they encounter (e.g., Bassili & Brown, 2005; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Musch & Klauer, 2003; Zajonc, 1980). The automatic activation of an evaluation, or attitude, toward a stimulus can occur even when one is unaware of the respective stimulus itself (e.g., Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989). To date, this body of work has almost exclusively addressed the automatic activation of attitudes in response to stimuli that denote objects that one can literally move toward or away from in physical space—in other words, “graspable” stimuli such as concrete objects (e.g., apple, garbage) and group members (e.g., Blacks, elderly; Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; cf. Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002).

In contrast, there has been virtually no research on the attitudes that are automatically activated in response to more abstract constructs such as the goals and values that govern behavior more generally within and across situations. This relative lack of attention might stem from assumptions about what attitude objects typically do and do not entail. Whereas one’s evaluations of physical objects (e.g., puppy), people (e.g., the elderly), and issues (e.g., abortion) are normally classified as attitudes, one’s evaluations of end-states (e.g., being thin) and modes of conduct (e.g., egalitarianism) tend to be classified as indices of goal importance or strength (and sometimes values; Allport, 1961; Feather, 1992, 1995, 1996; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Locke & Latham, 1990; Maio, Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001; Roehn, 2000; Rokeach, 1968, 1973, 1980; M. J. Rosenberg, 1960; Schwartz, 1994, 1999; cf., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). However, such assumptions notwithstanding, an attitude object can consist of anything one can imagine (Allport, 1961; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio, 1986). From this perspective, attitude objects are clearly not limited to the targets of one’s behavior, such as other persons and items, but rather can include any “psychological object” (Thurstone, 1931) including the abstract goals, values, and social norms that might more generally guide our behavior across various targets.

What would an automatically activated attitude toward a goal construct reflect? If the evaluative information that is automatically activated on perception of a stimulus is reflective of the person’s approach versus avoidance tendencies toward that stimulus (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Fazio, 1986, 1989, 2001; Ferguson & Bargh, 2002, 2004; Katz, 1960; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Ohman, 1986; Pratkanis, Breckler, & Greenwald, 1989; Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1992; Smith et al., 1995), then one’s automatic attitude toward a goal construct should reflect the person’s tendency to approach (i.e., pursue) that goal, which in turn should predict her or his goal-consistent behavior. For example, just as automatic attitudes toward stereotypically Black names can predict subtle and overt behavior during a subsequent encounter with a Black person (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003), automatic attitudes toward egalitarianism might be equally or differentially predictive of egalitarianism-related behavior. In this way, the evaluative information that is automatically activated in response to a goal construct might be understood as an implicit index of that goal’s likely influence on the person’s behavior.

To address this possibility, the current set of experiments tested whether automatic evaluations of goals predict and influence goal-pursuit. In the first experiment, the goal of egalitarianism was subjected to subliminal evaluative conditioning. The goal (i.e., the words fair, equal) received positive, neutral, or no conditioning. Participants then were asked to read a vignette and make a hiring decision according to ethnicity. Those who received positive conditioning were significantly less likely than those who received neutral and those who received no conditioning to exhibit prejudicial decision-making. This finding suggests that the implicit positivity associated with an abstract goal causally increases the likelihood of behavior relevant to that goal.

In the second experiment, the predictive validity of automatic evaluations of goals was compared with that for explicit attitudes toward the goal and explicitly measured goal commitment. The goal under investigation was the goal to be thin. Participants were asked in the first phase of the experiment to complete the 3 types of measures mentioned above. Participants were then contacted after 1 week or longer, and asked to indicate the number of times over the past week they had resisted eating tempting foods (a strategy identified by pilot testing as important for the goal to be thin). Only participants’ automatic evaluation of the goal was a significant predictor of the reported behaviors.
In a third experiment, the predictive validity of participants' automatic evaluation of the goal to be thin versus their automatic evaluation of a tempting food was examined. Participants were told that they would be sampling either a tempting or non-tempting snack. They then completed an implicit attitude measure (toward the goal as well as the tempting food). They then sampled the snack, and the amount they ate was measured. Participants' automatic evaluation of the goal significantly predicted how much of the tempting snack they ate (but not the non-tempting snack), while their automatic evaluation of the tempting food did not.

Together, this set of findings extends the work showing that automatic evaluative processes play an important role in goal pursuit and self-regulation (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). In particular, they suggest that automatic evaluations of abstract, desirable end-states possess predictive validity for goal relevant behavior, more so possibly than explicit attitudes, explicitly measured goal commitment, and automatic evaluations of concrete, goal-relevant objects.

“Automatic Evaluations and Self-Control”
Darlene Walsh, University of Toronto
Andrew Mitchell, University of Toronto

Research on implicit motivation has shown that the activation of a goal automatically increases the positivity of automatic evaluations towards objects useful in attaining that goal (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). In addition, Custers and Aarts (2005) find that creating automatic positive evaluations of a goal enhances the motivation to achieve the goal i.e. a positive automatic evaluation towards a goal “pushes” you to succeed. However, in the context of a self-control dilemma, it is unclear whether a strong positive automatic evaluation of a long-term goal guarantees successful self-control. Thus, the role that implicit motivation might play in terms of the self-control process is the central focus of the research described below.

A secondary focus of this research is to examine the mechanism underlying self-control. Traditionally, the process underlying self-control process has been thought of as a controlled process (e.g. Baumeister, Heatherton and Tice, 1994; Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Trope & Fishbach, 2000). Recent research, however, finds that pursuing goals does not always involve deliberate, conscious intention (see the auto-motive model by Bargh, 1990). Applying this to self-control, the process that underlies successful self-control need not always be controlled. In support of this concept, Fishbach, Friedman and Kruglanski (2003) have shown that exposure to short-term temptations may automatically activate one’s long-term goals and consequently prevent these temptations from influencing one’s behaviour. However, in a previous experiment, we found that although restrained eaters with automatic goal activation prior to exposure to a temptation were able to resist a temptation under low cognitive load, they nevertheless succumb to temptation when placed under high cognitive load (Walsh and Mitchell, 2006). While these results are intriguing, we do not know whether they hold when goal activation is measured while exposed to an actual temptation. Said differently, will individuals who automatically activate the goal during exposure to a real temptation also succumb to temptation when placed under high cognitive load.

In order to tackle the research issues outlined above, we designed two experiments that incorporate both theoretical approaches (i.e. implicit motivation and goal activation) to better understand the self-control process. Rather than focusing on more general temptations and goals, we focus on a specific self-control dilemma among restrained eaters the ability to resist fattening foods. In the first study, we measure goal-temptation associations and automatic evaluations of both goals and temptations before exposure to a real temptation, and then again while participants are exposed to a real temptation--mini-chocolate chip cookies. Participants were then left alone in the room with the cookies for approximately 2 minutes under either low or high cognitive load. The main dependent measure was the amount of cookies each participant consumed under the two cognitive load conditions.

Interestingly, we found differences in terms of goal activation before and during exposure. In fact, we classified restrained eaters on 2 dimensions: whether they activate the goal before exposure (or not), and the whether they activate the goal during exposure (or not). Under low cognitive load, restrained eaters with goal activation (regardless of whether the goal activation occurred before or during exposure), are better equipped to deal with temptations as shown through their consumption patterns, relative to the individuals without activation, suggesting that goal activation facilitates self-control. Under high cognitive load, restrained eaters who automatically activate the goal during exposure do not succumb to temptation when placed under high cognitive load, suggesting that temptations are capable activating an automatic self-control process. However, individuals who do not show goal activation before or during exposure consume the same regardless of load. And individuals who automatically activate the goal before, but not during exposure, consume much more under high cognitive load. These individuals seem to inhibit the diet goal when faced with a temptation.

In terms of automatic evaluations, all restrained eaters have strong positive automatic evaluations of cookies before exposure to the real temptation. The interesting theoretical question is whether these evaluations change when measured during exposure to the temptation. Interestingly, the individuals who automatically activate the diet goal while exposed to a temptation no longer have a positive automatic evaluation towards the temptation during exposure—the evaluations become neutral. We also found a positive relationship between the automatic evaluation of cookies and consumption among those who do not automatically activate the diet goal. In terms of automatic evaluations towards dieting, only those who show goal activation before exposure automatically evaluate diet as positive before exposure. Similarly, only those who activate the goal during exposure to the temptation have an automatic positive evaluation of the goal during exposure. Interestingly, there was no significant correlation between consumption and automatic evaluations of diet.

In a second study, we again measure goal-temptation associations and automatic evaluations of goals and temptations before and during exposure to a real temptation (e.g. tray of mini-chocolate chip cookies). This time we measured moment-to-moment tracking of their approach and avoidance reactions to a temptation i.e. we elicited spontaneous reactions to the cookies via a joystick that recorded evaluation every second. We found that over time, individuals who activate the goal during exposure neither avoid nor approach the temptation. Restained eaters who inhibited the diet goal when faced with a temptation, however, initially approach the temptation, but over time, they begin to strongly avoid the temptation. Finally, those who never activate the diet goal mainly approach the temptation; over time, they begin to lose the approach, but never to the point where they avoid the temptation.

The present research makes important contributions to the literature. We find that individuals who automatically activate a long-term goal while exposed to a real temptation activate an automatic self-control process. We also show that activation of a goal automatically decreases the positivity of automatic evaluations towards objects not useful in attaining that goal. We interpret
this to suggest that the self-control process is one that modifies the evaluation of the temptation. Further, individuals who automatically activate the diet goal before exposure, but not during exposure, succumb to temptation when placed under high cognitive load, suggesting that exposure to real cookies inhibit the diet goal among these individuals. Cognitive resources are required in order for these individuals to convince themselves that the temptation is not appealing, which will then lead to successful self-control.
It’s All in How You Look at it–The Impact of Having an Incremental or Entity Theory on Consumer Behavior
Subbu Sivaramakrishnan, University of Manitoba, Canada

SESSION OVERVIEW
It is well known that people have lay or implicit theories—informal theories about different phenomena, often not based on any scientific evidence. One such category of implicit theories is the theory that people have about how likely something is to change. Research in social and developmental psychology by Dweck and her associates (see Dweck 1999 for a review) has posited that everyone holds a theory, with varying magnitude, on the extent to which their traits are likely to change, which they term “self-theories”. For example, those with an entity theory of personality believe that personality consists of fixed, static traits and people are inherently made in a certain way that cannot be changed. On the other hand, those with an incremental theory of personality believe that personality consists of dynamic personal qualities that can be changed and developed. A number of studies by Dweck and her associates have shown that entity theorists hold attitudes that are relatively rigid and are more likely to make stereotypical judgments from limited information. In contrast, incremental theorists, who believe that people’s behavior is not static, hold attitudes that are relatively malleable and are much less prone to making stereotypical final judgments and instead base their evaluations on a variety of available information (Erdley and Dweck 1993). Dweck posits that entity or incremental theories can be held for any trait pertaining to the self—personality, intelligence, social skills, etc.

It can be easily seen how people could have an incremental or entity theory about variables that are of interest to marketers and have significant implications for consumer behavior. For example, one may have an incremental or entity theory about how likely a salesperson’s personality is to change, to what extent a particular brand’s traits can be extended to other products, how likely a particular product category is to change what it claims to (e.g., weight loss programs, hair growth formulas, memory-enhancing supplements), and so on. These are just some examples of consumer behavior research in a domain that the larger marketing academic community has had limited exposure to. While implicit theories can play a major role in consumer behavior, research pertaining to the concept is only beginning in our area.

The objective of this proposed special session is three-fold. First, it will provide a forum for consumer behavior researchers to be exposed to the richness of the research on implicit theories, specifically self-theories—a domain that is yet to be tapped in the consumer behavior literature. This will be accomplished to a large extent by the first presenter, complemented by the next two presenters. Second, it intends to highlight the relevance and implications of self-theories in consumer behavior. This will be done through two presentations that will present research examining the role of self-theories in two quite different consumption contexts—the first on perception of salespeople and the second on acceptance of brand extensions. Third, the most valuable objective of this session is to kindle interest and encourage consumer behavior research involving self-theories. With the exception of Flaherty and Pappas (2000), to our knowledge, there is no current published research in marketing that has addressed self-theories. Therefore, the content of this session will be novel and informative to the conference audience. All three presentations have been chosen such that they are based on research at the completion or near-completion stage (working manuscripts will be made available). The first presentation is based on thirty years of published and unpublished research; the second and the third presentations are each based on three empirical studies. Concurrent with the third objective, the discussion and Q&A session is expected to initiate substantive interaction and generate interest in an area rich in consumer research potential.

The first talk will be by Carol Dweck (Stanford University), who has researched implicit theories for over thirty years. She has numerous papers on the role of self-theories in journals such as Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Psychological Inquiry, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Review, Developmental Psychology, and Child Development, to name a few, besides several books on the topic. In Dweck’s talk, she will review existing research on implicit theories, present new work (not yet published), and describe the implications of her work for consumer behavior. Dweck will explain how self-theories guide people’s attitude and behavior, both in marketing and non-marketing contexts. Using data from numerous fascinating studies, she will demonstrate that when people believe that an ability is dynamic and can be developed, they are motivated to do so, but when people are led to believe that ability is static and cannot be changed, they adopt a performance orientation trying to prove they already have the ability. In particular, Dweck’s talk will include the role that having an entity or incremental theory plays in consumer behavior, such as how the theory (incremental or entity) that consumers have determines the products and brands they buy, how they react to celebrity endorsements, and how they form impressions of salespeople in retail encounters.

The second presentation by Subramanian Sivaramakrishnan (University of Manitoba), Harish Sujan (Tulane University), and Mita Sujan (Tulane University) will be on the moderating role of implicit theories in cognitively busy consumers’ ability to revise their initial judgments of salespeople. They will present the results of experiments in which they examine the role of self-theories on consumers’ ability to revise their negative initial judgment of a salesperson while interacting with the salesperson. In study 1, they establish that judgment revision is a resource-consuming task that can be impaired by cognitive busyness caused by thinking of questions. In study 2, they show that whether the consumer has an incremental or entity theory of personality moderates the effect of cognitive busyness on judgment revision. In study 3, they show that information signals enable judgment revision even among those cognitively busy consumers whose initial judgments may be relatively rigid. Their research argues that when the initial impression of the salesperson is malleable (incremental theory), overcoming cognitive busyness caused by active listening is possible. Even entity theorists can overcome cognitive busyness and make a judgment revision, provided they are given pointers of the information to follow.

The final presentation by Eric Yorkston (Texas Christian University), Joseph Nunes (University of Southern California), and Shashi Matta (Ohio State University) will demonstrate how the theories people have about their own personality impact their assessment of brands’ personality, particularly in the case of brand extensions. They will present the results of three experiments in which they examine the role that the theory one has about one’s own
personality traits influence their theory on the malleability of product traits. In study 1, they show that incremental theorists are more accepting of brand extensions or repositioning. In study 2, they show that acceptability of a brand extension is based on the implicit theory that the consumer has and not on the number of brand extensions generated. In study 3, they examine boundary conditions for how far incremental theorists are willing to stretch a brand’s traits before they experience a violation of their implicit theory. Their research presents an alternative view to product adoption by suggesting that early versus late product adoption may not be as much a function of risk tolerance as it may be of the implicit theory (incremental or entity) that consumers carry about their personality. Specifically, those with an incremental theory are more willing to adopt new products due to the malleable view they have of product traits.

EXTENDED ABSTRACTS

“Implicit Theories: Implications for Consumer Behavior”
Carol S. Dweck, Stanford University

My research on implicit theories has demonstrated the power of simple beliefs to affect people’s judgments, motivation, and behavior. In this talk, I will review past work on implicit theories, I will present new work (not yet published), and I will describe implications for consumer behavior. The implicit theories I have focused on relate to whether individuals believe that human qualities are fixed or malleable. An “entity” theory posits that human traits, such as intelligence or personality, are immutable entities: Each person has a certain amount of intelligence or a certain personality and cannot do much to change it. In contrast, an “incremental” theory rests on the idea that human traits can be developed: Everyone can take measures to increase their intellectual or social abilities.

What is the impact of these implicit theories? The research shows that they affect two broad classes of phenomena. First, implicit theories affect the personal goals people pursue and, second, they affect the judgments and decisions people make about others. I discuss each in turn.

Self-Theories

It has been consistently shown that when people hold an entity theory, their primary goals revolve around proving themselves. In other words, if you only have a fixed amount of competence, then you will be invested in documenting its adequacy. Entity theorists may reject valuable learning opportunities—even at great risk to their future success—if there is a danger of making errors or revealing a deficiency. They may also give up readily in the face of setbacks, worrying that the setback reflects on their ability. In contrast, when people hold an incremental theory, their primary goals revolve around improving themselves. For them, it is not about presenting and glorifying, but bettering the self. As a result, they welcome challenges and see errors and setbacks as a natural part of learning.

In several new neurophysiological studies, we monitored people’s brain waves (ERP: event-related potentials) as they worked on a task. We found that entity theorists really harnessed their attention (and showed strong reactions) to information that told them whether their answers had been right or wrong. Once they knew that, they had little interest in further information. In contrast, incremental theorists paid most attention to information that taught them something new.

Perhaps most important, we have shown that implicit theories can be primed or changed—and when they are, motivation and behavior are changed as well. That is, when people are led to believe that an ability can be developed, they become motivated to do so, but when they are led to believe that the ability is carved in stone, they simply want to show they already have it.

Implications of Self-Theories for Consumer Behavior

This work on self-theories has a number of implications for marketing and consumer behavior. First, it suggests that entity theorists are more likely to seek status, popularity, and the appearance of competence through their product purchases—brand names and the status of other product users will matter more to them. In contrast, incremental theorists will seek growth and will favor products that foster self-development. In line with this, the work also suggests that if a product’s appeal will be mostly for entity theorists or for incremental theorists, then messages may be best communicated by inducing an entity or incremental theory mindset at the start of the message. If a product requires a period of learning (as did, for example, the Nordic Track exercise machine), entity theorists may too quickly conclude they are incompetent at it and may reject the product. In short, individuals with different implicit theories are looking for different things, and messages or products that match their mindset will be processed and reacted to preferentially.

Theories About Other People

When people believe that human qualities are fixed, they seek to judge those qualities in others—in other individuals and in other groups. Moreover, they believe that these fixed traits are readily apparent and easy to judge. As a result, entity theorists form rapid judgments—and stereotypes—that are hard to overturn. In contrast, incremental theorists, not believing in fixed traits, form their impressions over time, taking account of the situation and readily updating first impressions in light of new information. Moreover, they are more impressed by people who gain competence over time than those who start off with competence but don’t use it.

New research, for example, shows that entity theorists are far more likely to fall prey to the “fundamental attribution error.” When forming an impression of a new person, they are more likely to take account of the situation than the target person is in and much more likely to think the behavior reflects underlying traits. In contrast, even when under cognitive load, incremental theorists factor the situation into their judgment of the person.

Implications of Theories About Other People for Consumer Behavior

Because entity theorists make rapid and rigid judgments, their first impression of a product or a marketer are paramount. A negative impression will be hard to overcome. However, this also means that once a positive impression has been made, entity theorists may be more loyal to the product and to the marketer. This also suggests that attaching a star, an authority, or a high status person to a product will affect entity theorists’ judgments more. They will invest these individuals with more credibility than will incremental theorists, and will also desire the products they think these individuals use. More compelling to incremental theorists would be individuals who have stretched, struggled, and overcome obstacles, for it is these people that they hold in higher esteem, and they are likely to attach more credibility to their testimonials.

In summary, implicit theories tell us a great deal about people’s motivation and decision processes, and hold promise of revealing much about consumer behavior.