Are “Paradigms Lost” in Marketing? Some Twenty Years Later…: a Content Analysis

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It has been more than twenty years since Deshpande (1983) wrote his “Paradigms Lost” article. My objective in this paper is an attempt to provide a more statistical account of the article’s claim that quantitative research dominates the marketing literature, but after some twenty years later. A content analysis of the three leading journals in marketing (JM, JMR and JCR) was done for three years (2002 to 2004). The findings do provide “snapshot” evidence of the dominance of the quantitative paradigm. However, though purely qualitative studies are still minimal, their integration with quantitative studies maybe catching pace.

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Are “Paradigms Lost” in Marketing? Some Twenty Years Later…: A Content Analysis

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Extended Abstract

In the fall of 1983, Rohit Deshpande wrote an article in the Journal of Marketing entitled “Paradigms lost: On Theory and Method in Research in Marketing.” The article presented a discussion of the dominance of the positivist or quantitative paradigm over the much neglected qualitative one in marketing. Our objective in this paper is an attempt to provide a more statistical account of the article’s claim that quantitative research dominates the marketing literature, but after some twenty years later.

The quantitative-qualitative debate is a lengthy one that dates back to the late nineteenth century with the growth of the interpretive approach (qualitative approach) to social inquiry which was considered a reaction to the positivist approach (Giddens, 1976; Hughes, 1958; Outhwaite, 1975, 1983; Polkinghorne, 1983; Smith 1983a, 1983b). Several researchers point out the need for and importance of qualitative research which would help provide a better understanding of the complex nature of the social world we live in (Cronbach 1975; Hirschman 1986). Others disagree and state that such qualitative research is purely subjective (Smith and Heshusius 1986) and some go as far as claiming that “it doesn’t constitute market research” and that “two people doing the same qualitative study can obtain totally different results” (Achenbaum 2001, p. 14).

On comparing the two methodologies, some say that they can be considered as mutually exclusive (Tauber 1987) and each method has its own set of different evaluation criteria (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Brodbeck (1968, p. 573) states that “the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy is spurious,” and Seymour (1989) argues that consumer research should not be an “either/or” case when it comes to the type of methodology used but rather it should be able to encompass and build a more comprehensive understanding of the consumer. He further recommends staying away from being too focused on the method and the “technique-driven-and lose track of the real purpose in generating information” (p. 27). Likewise, Kassarjian (1989) offers a similar view as he says that “the appropriate question is whether or not it is good science, rather than what kind of science it is,” and “is it making a contribution to knowledge?” (p. 126).

In the “Paradigms Lost” article, the focus of our paper here, Deshpande argues that the marketing literature has been dominated by one paradigm and that is the logical empiricism/positivism or the quantitative paradigm. He offers a discussion on the dominance of the quantitative paradigm over the often abandoned qualitative one which may be responsible for the low development of theory construction in marketing research. He suggests attaining a balance between the two paradigms and calls for more triangulation of methods and using each method more appropriately. This would be in an attempt to reduce the current bias that exists especially when addressing the issues of theory discovery versus theory verification.

In this study we used a content analysis procedure to investigate our research question of whether quantitative methods research does dominate the marketing literature even after twenty years of the “Paradigms Lost” article. We reviewed all the articles for the top three marketing journals (Hult, Neese, and Bashaw 1997), namely: the Journal of Marketing (JM), the Journal of Marketing Research (JMR), and the Journal of Consumer Research (JCR) from the years 2002 to 2004. We chose the past three years to reflect a “snapshot” of the recent trend. We basically classified each article on whether it was a quantitative study, a qualitative one or both based strictly on the research methodology used. Thus articles that do not include any methodology used were considered not applicable.

We analyzed a total of 394 articles (109 in JM, 115 in JMR and 170 in JCR). Almost half (47.2%) of all the articles published were of the quantitative methodology. Purely qualitative articles made up a mere 7.1% and articles containing both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies made up 32.7%. Articles that were considered not applicable made up the remaining 12.9%.

When looking at the journals more specifically, we found that JCR had the highest percentage of purely quantitative articles (65.3%) and at the same time it had the highest percentage of qualitative articles (13.5%). JMR had the lowest percentage of qualitative articles with only one article in the three years investigated! And JM also had a very low percentage of qualitative articles (3.7%). However, both JMR and JM had the highest percentage of articles with both methodologies used. Based on this analysis, it may be feasible perhaps to say that a researcher looking to publish a purely qualitative study may be far better off shooting for JCR than JMR or even JM.

In terms of the types of methodologies used, experiments showed up as the highest percentage of methodology used, accounting for 41.4% of all the journal articles. Surveys, interviews and secondary data analysis were all almost similar in the percentage used (15-17%). To be more specific, qualitative articles were dominated by experiments and qualitative articles were dominated by interviews. Furthermore, in terms of the journals, JM was dominated by surveys, JMR was dominated by secondary data analysis and JCR was dominated by experiments. These particular findings provide further evidence of the dominance of the quantitative methodologies in marketing journals and perhaps indicate the preferences of certain methodologies over others.

In conclusion, based on our limited study, we have attempted to provide some preliminary evidence of the dominance of the quantitative paradigm over the much neglected qualitative paradigm in the marketing literature, even after more than twenty years of the “Paradigms Lost” article. However, the clear sign of studies including both methodologies provides growing evidence that even though purely qualitative studies are still minimal, their integration with quantitative studies may be catching pace.

References

Compulsive Buyers and the Emotional Roller Coaster in Shopping

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Extended Abstract

Shopping is increasingly seen as a recreational activity in which consumers are emotionally involved. Instead of going to a store to buy necessary items, consumers often stroll around and browse for hours just for the fun of it. Shopping provides a necessary escape for consumers whose lives are hectic or otherwise troublesome. However, for some consumers, shopping can become more than recreation. Compulsive shoppers are consumers who are addicted to shopping. For these consumers, shopping is part of their lifestyle, and strongly related to emotional goals.

The emotions compulsive shoppers go through influence their feelings and satisfaction of the shopping activity. For example, consumers who have a bad day might go shopping to cheer themselves up, or consumers who have completed a difficult task at work might reward themselves by going shopping. For compulsive shoppers, the emotions involved with the shopping activity are particularly important, as they play such a large part of the consumer’s life and influence their happiness as a whole. Feelings such as joy, anticipation, thrill during the shopping activity can quickly shift over to guilt, depression, and dissatisfaction with managing one’s finances. Based on previous research results, literature has termed these consumers bulimic shoppers, who crave for shopping in excess, but afterwards get emotional qualms.

The emotions involved with shopping activities have usually been studied by examining how consumers feel before and after the shopping activity. The purpose of this paper is to extend on this view by examining consumers feelings with the shopping activity before, during and after the shopping process, to receive a more comprehensive picture of the emotional shifts consumers go through during the shopping activity. By examining all three stages, we expect to get a more refined picture of how emotions can change during the shopping activity, and what the triggers involved in these changes are.

To achieve the goal of the study, a three-step research methodology was employed. We first utilized an online questionnaire to identify consumers who could be classified as compulsive shoppers. Then, we conducted a digital ethnography study by communicating with consumers using their mobile phones. By communicating with consumers before, during, and after the shopping process using SMS and picture messages, we were able to be sensitive to the emotional changes consumers go through while shopping. Finally, we conducted personal interviews with the compulsive shoppers to hear them describe their feelings involved with the shopping activity, and their emotions towards shopping in their own words. The three steps complemented each other, and provided us with the ability to cross-check and validate results across the different kinds of data collected.

The results show that compulsive shoppers go through an emotional rollercoaster during the shopping process. The trigger involved with the emotions is closely linked to finding a bargain. A bargain is defined as a good deal, or a situation in which the consumers perceive they get mental satisfaction from their purchase. If compulsive shoppers make a bargain, they feel pride, happiness, and goal achievement. However, if they do not manage to find a bargain, they feel disappointed, sad, and unsuccessful. These emotions switch back and forth during the shopping activity. The largest disappointment for these consumers comes if they think they have managed to find a bargain, but realize that it was not one, after all (e.g., the item is too expensive, or they do not have it in the customers’ size). However, this disappointment can be overturned if another bargain is found. These findings expand on those found by previous literature by showing the emotions consumers go through during the shopping process are not predominantly negative or positive before or after the shopping process. Instead, consumers move up and down on an emotional continuum during shopping, and can also feel pride and satisfaction after shopping if they manage to find a bargain.

References


Knowledge Transfer and Rhetoric: The Influence of Rhetorical Figures on Consumer Learning

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Extended Abstract

Recently, researchers in marketing have begun to investigate the processes of internal knowledge transfer that consumers engage in when learning about a new, unfamiliar product (Gregan-Paxton, Hibbard, Brunel and Azar 2002; Gregan-Paxton and Moreau 2003; Moreau, Lehman and Markman 2001; Moreau, Markman and Lehmann 2001, Roehm and Sterntal 2001). This stream of research promises to expand our understanding of how consumers use existing knowledge to help them learn about unfamiliar products as well as ways in which this learning process can be influenced. Based on work done in cognitive psychology, the dominant theory driving this stream of research is analogical reasoning, which holds that we learn about new products much in the same way as we solve analogies (Gentner and Gentner 1983; Genter, 1989; Holyoak, Gentner, and Kokinov 2001; Markman and Gentner 2001; Vosniadou 1989). In applying and testing this theory in marketing, consumer researchers have often employed analogies in the headlines or copy of advertisements used as experimental stimuli. The use of an analogy in an ad has been found to influence the way consumers learn about the products being advertised (Gregan-Paxton, Hibbard, Brunel and Azar 2002; Gregan-Paxton and Moreau 2003). In spite of this explicit use of analogy, consumer researchers have failed to acknowledge the fact that an analogy is a rhetorical figure and thus have neglected to incorporate findings from the literature on rhetorical figures (McQuarrie and Mick, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2003) and persuasive communication.

This research seeks to answer the following question: what influence does the use of rhetorical figures in marketing communication have on consumer learning? Specifically, the impact on consumer learning will be examined from the perspective of internal knowledge transfer and the validity of the inferences consumers draw after exposure to a persuasive communication containing a rhetorical figure. One goal of this proposed research is to expand the scope of studies on knowledge transfer to a different context: the health care industry, specifically prescription drugs. Prescription drugs represent a different category of products than consumer electronics on many levels: consumers cannot directly buy prescription drugs; prescription drugs are incredibly complex in terms of interactions with other medications and/or lifestyles; prescription drugs have a direct and potentially powerful impact on consumers’ health and well being as well as a far reaching impact on public policy and society in general (for example Coney 2002; Lexchin and Mintzes 2002; Roth, 1996; Menon, Deshpande, Zinkhan and Perri 2004; Narayanan, Desiraju and Chintagunta 2004).

In an initial study, 260 undergraduate students from the introductory marketing course at a large Canadian university were exposed to six versions of a print ad for Gentrex, a fictitious brand name for a medication to treat genital herpes. This study was intended to serve as a test of a selected medical condition (genital herpes) and drug therapy as well as to investigate whether there were any substantial differences among subjects at processing similes versus metaphors. Even though metaphors and similes are both technically analogies, they represent different forms (implied versus explicit) and may have a differential impact on knowledge transfer processes.

The experimental design for the study was a 3 x 2 between subjects design. The first factor refers to the type of rhetorical figure used in the headline, with the following three conditions: simile, metaphor or declarative (non-figurative) statement. A declarative statement
was included as a third headline in order to have a baseline against which to evaluate the simile and metaphor headlines. The different headlines for each category were: Gentrex is like a sleeping pill for genital herpes (simile); One Gentrex a day keeps genital herpes at bay (metaphor); Gentrex suppresses genital herpes (declarative statement). The second factor pertains to the copy that appeared in the ad, with the following two conditions: no copy, and copy. The amount of copy contained within the ad was varied to test for any differences in processing due to the inclusion of additional information.

A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference in the mean levels of perceived creativity between the figurative headlines (simile and metaphor) and the non-figurative headline, suggesting a successful manipulation. As expected, no significant difference was found between simile and metaphor, suggesting subjects perceived the two forms of analogy similarly. Following previous research on knowledge transfer in consumer research (Gregan-Paxton and Moreau, 2003), the nature and extent of subjects’ internal knowledge transfer was captured by having subjects complete two cognitive response tasks. Thought protocol analysis revealed that simile and metaphor comparisons were not significantly different at encouraging relational knowledge transfer. This suggests that simile and metaphor should have similar effects on consumer knowledge transfer.

More than one quarter of all subjects (26%) made the inference that Gentrex cures genital herpes. Currently, there is no cure for genital herpes and no information in the ads shown to subjects indicated that Gentrex can cure genital herpes; however, it is conceivable that subjects might have inferred this from the ad headline. When the ad contained no copy, subjects in the analogical comparison conditions were significantly more likely to make the curative inference than subjects exposed to the declarative condition. This finding suggests that subjects exposed to analogical comparisons engaged in further elaboration of the message than subjects exposed to the declarative statement, but that the analogical inferences made were not valid. All subjects were relative novices, and therefore might not have been able to judge the validity of their inferences. When the ad contained copy, there were no significant differences among conditions at making the invalid inference (proportions were .14 for simile, .25 for metaphor and .16 for declarative). Additionally, the finding points to the potential danger of analogical comparisons involving medication. If there is no text that corrects for invalid inferences, or, as is more likely the case in a natural setting, consumers do not pay attention to the copy and only read the headline, consumers are in danger of drawing invalid, misleading conclusions about the advertised medication.

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Distrust: An Alternative Source of Power For Consumers
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Extended Abstract
The broad objectives of this article are to make theoretical arguments and to provide empirical support for the significance of studying consumer distrust. More specifically, we study consumers’ distrust in various key institutions in the food system, and describe how consumer distrust in various social institutions shapes their beliefs about food safety. It has been argued that trust plays an important role in shaping consumer beliefs about food safety in general and beliefs about the novel food applications in particular (e.g. irradiated foods and genetically modified foods) (Juannillo 2001; McGarity and Hansen 2001). In this paper, we argue that, in order to have a more complete understanding about consumer beliefs in food safety, in addition to trust, consumer researchers and policy makers should also pay attention to the concept of distrust. A review of the literature both in consumer research and in other areas of social sciences suggests that as most researchers have dealt with the concept of trust, very limited attention has been paid to the concept of distrust.

Marketing literature does not provide a definition for distrust for the same reason that it treats distrust as the negative polar of a single trust continuum. Scholars in other disciplines provided a view of distrust; however, they, too, have mainly conceptualized distrust as “lack of” trust, not as a separate construct (these points will be elaborated in the next section). Deutsch’s (1962) conceptualization of trust and distrust appears to make clearer distinctions between the two. Deutsch (1962) viewed trust as an individual’s confidence in the intentions and capabilities of a relationship partner and the belief that a relationship partner would behave as one hoped. His view of distrust builds around suspicion and fear: confidence about a relationship partner’s undesirable behavior, stemming from knowledge of the individual’s capabilities and intentions. More recently, Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998) mentioned distrust as confident negative expectations involving fear of another’s conduct.

We conceptualized distrust in terms of confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct. More specifically, distrust in social institutions is conceptualized as consumers’ confident negative expectations regarding institution A’s conduct (words, actions, and decisions), and confident negative expectations as a fear of, a propensity to attribute sinister intentions to, and a desire to buffer oneself from the effects of institution A’s conduct.

Institutional distrust (as distrust directed at social institutions such as the government or manufacturers) can be studied in two ways. One is to view distrust as “lack of,” “loss of,” or “decreased” trust, and therefore study it in “trust” terms. Another way to deal with institutional distrust is to call it by its name and work to understand what caused it and what is maintaining it. Most studies have followed the former view, which I see as shortsighted. For example, in their study of distrust in institutions in nine post-Communist societies, Rose and Mishler (1997), conceptualized distrust as “lack of trust” and introduced subjects with the statements “There are many institutions in this country, for example, the government, courts, police, and civil servants. Please show me on this 7-point scale, where 1 represents great trust and 7 represents great distrust, how much is your personal trust in each of the following.” (p.8). When distrust is conceptualized as “decreased” or “lack of” trust, and measured along the same trust/distrust continuum, then it assumes that distrust exists in terms of trust, not as a separate concept (i.e. low levels of trust would mean distrust). As a result, respondents are forced to indicate whether trust or distrust toward an institution. This generalized approach does not allow the possibility that individuals can trust an institution in some areas and distrust it in others. In other words, this view omits the possibility that distrust in institutions may exist independently of the level of trust individuals might have in these institutions given different contexts. For example, government may be trusted to deal with foreign threats but may be distrusted to eliminate corruption. In this case trust and distrust may grow or decline based on different elements and may be caused by different antecedents.

We believe that current conceptualizations of trust and distrust (distrust as opposite of trust) leave us only with the “tool” of trust to deal with social problems. However, when trust and distrust are considered as separate constructs, both can be utilized independently to deal with complex social phenomena. In other words, our view also suggests that elements of trust and elements of distrust toward an institution separately may be used as strategy tools by individuals in a complex social system. The Rose and Mishler (1997) study, mentioned above, reported that individuals scored low on the 1-7 distrust/trust scale for most institutions, and therefore concluded that distrust is the persisting attitude in these societies. A summary analysis that low trust would actually mean distrust may lead us nowhere from idealized models of civic democracies. However, as we know, in most civic democracies distrust (and also trust) in institutions exists and persists, perhaps even as the backbone of these democratic societies. As Barber (1983) suggests “A democratic polity requires legitimate criticisms based on democratic allegiance, some distrust, in this sense, is essential for viable democratic order. Others have point this issue as paradox of democracy: “the more there is institutionalized distrust, the more there will be spontaneous trust” (Sztompka 1999, p. 140).

In summary, we believe that there is both merit and need in investigating distrust as a separate concept. We further believe that insights gathered through such attempts can provide guidance for public policy makers in their attempts to handle social issues and problems. For example, by studying consumer distrust in the context food safety (like in this paper,) we can have a more comprehensive understanding about consumers’ orientations for various novel food applications including irradiated foods and genetically modified foods. In this paper, after providing an overview of our research context and activities that took place between 1999-2003 in the Midwest, we report our findings related to consumer distrust in social institution. Based on the data collected through in-depth interviews, we identified three dimensions of consumer distrust within which social institution of the food system can be viewed. Then, we conclude the paper with a general discussion of contributions and implications for consumer, for academicians, for practitioners (e.g. the food industry) and for public policy makers.

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Spinning Fantasies into Consumer Attitudes: A Fantasy-Realization Perspective of Attitude Formation

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Extended Abstract

Every consumer fantasizes about obtaining better things such as a better car, a new flat panel TV, or a dream vacation. Yet, as ubiquitous as such fantasies are, they are often times not realized. One reason individuals’ positive fantasies become doomed to the limbo of the mind is that individuals do not possess the goal, or at least a strong enough goal, to make their fantasies into reality. Interestingly, fairly little empirical attention has been given to determine how or why people set goals in the first place, and how committed individuals become to their goals. Yet, such empirical considerations are important if marketers are to understand when and how consumers form goals to purchase products.

Potentially guiding such considerations, Oettingen (1996) has suggested that how individuals think about the future may be important in understanding how they come to set goals and commit to them. She offers that individuals can think about the future in two ways—by generating or considering expectations about what outcomes are likely to occur in the future, or by indulging in free fantasies. Free-fantasies involve individuals’ imagination about what it would be like to attain a desirable future outcome (e.g., buying a desired new car). Importantly, free-fantasies can occur independently of individuals’ expectations that the events about which they fantasize are likely to occur. For example, many consumers can fantasize about owning a new Ferrari, yet fully expect that actually owning such a car will never be within their financial reach.

In her Fantasy Realization Theory (FRT), Oettingen (1996) offers three ways an individual might deal with fantasies about the future and relate them back to their current situation as a means of realizing the fantasy. That is, FRT offers three ways by which individuals’ fantasies may influence goal formation and commitment. Two of the possibilities create a readiness to act that is independent of expectations that the goal is attainable (e.g., the Ferrari example), whereas the third entails an expectancy-based readiness to act.

First, individuals may largely disregard positive fantasies about the future and instead dwell on a negative reality that stands in the way of a desired future. When individuals engage in this type of thinking they are left without the necessity to act. Further, and more importantly, by not fantasizing about the positive future individuals also lack a direction in which to act. As a result, goal commitment will only be influenced by the negative aspects one considers about the current reality. That is, expectations about the attainability of the positive outcome do not tend to influence goal commitment.

Second, individuals can think about positive fantasies without considering current situations that may impede their fantasy-realization, a type of thought akin to daydreaming. In this situation, individuals merely fantasize about the future and consider no information in the present reality that would cause them to reflect on the fact that their fantasy of the future has not been realized. Further, because individuals in this frame of mind do not ponder their reality, their expectations for attaining the positive outcome is not considered and, therefore, does not influence their commitment to achieving the outcome in their fantasy. Rather, the positive incentive of the desired future outcome within the fantasy supplies the only motivation to act.

Third, individuals may indulge in an expectation-based type of thinking in which a positive fantasy is contrasted with a negative reality that blocks the potential realization of a fantasy. In essence, mental contrasting reveals the desired future as something that is to be attained, and the negative reality as something that needs to be overcome. A necessity to act is produced that questions whether reality can be turned into fantasy. Goals are enacted or forgotten based on the individual’s degree of expectation of achieving that future. If expectations are high, then a committed goal will be formed, if expectations are low, a goal will not be formed.

To this point, FRT studies have relied on identifying expectations already held by participants. Of note, persuasion research (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) indicates that the presentation of strong or weak arguments influence individuals’ expectations that an attitude object is likely to produce positive or negative consequences. Thus, by manipulating argument quality, it is possible to manipulate individuals’ expectations that a fantasy is attainable (e.g., that they can, or cannot, purchase a car). Further, individuals form favorable attitudes toward the topic of the message when it is supported by strong arguments, but relatively unfavorable attitudes about a message if it is supported by weak arguments (Petty and Wegener 1991). Thus, FRT would suggest that individuals who compare positive fantasies and negative realities should be particularly influenced by the expectations induced by strong or weak arguments. As a result, these individuals should form favorable attitudes toward a message topic if it contains strong, relative to weak arguments. However, individuals who only consider positive fantasies, or negative aspects, should not be influenced by their expectations, and thus should form attitudes independent of the quality of the arguments they read.

Testing these predictions we manipulated participants’ mindset using methods similar to those used by Oettingen et al. (2001). Specifically, participants were induced to either dwell on negative realities that stand in the way of buying a new car, positive fantasies...
about buying a new car, or to mentally contrast both. They were then presented with an advertisement that offered excellent incentives for buying a new car (strong argument) or an advertisement that offered lackluster incentives for buying a new car (weak argument). We then administered a questionnaire about their expectations that buying a car was feasible and their attitudes toward buying a car in the near future.

As predicted, participants in the mental contrast condition who received a strong advertisement demonstrated more positive attitudes and higher expectations of buying a desired new car than those who received a weak advertisement. Further, participants in the other two conditions did not differ in their expectations or attitudes, regardless of which persuasive advertisement they received. These findings indicate that FRT can be usefully applied to research in consumer behavior.

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The Influence of Line and Surface Modifications in Product Design on Brand Recognition and Novelty
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Extended Abstract
The choice between novelty and familiarity when introducing a redesigned product is a crucial decision. How similar should the appearance of a redesigned product be compared to the old product to ensure brand familiarity? And, to what degree should the redesign look new in order to avoid boredom? A look into the processes of object perception reveals that novelty and similarity/familiarity are not two poles of the same dimension. Instead it is possible that consumers can perceive new products as both novel from and similar to a former product. According to the 4-stage model of object perception (cf. Palmer 1999; Palmer et al., 2003; Kreuzbauer & Malter 2006) a product which is perceived by a consumer passes 4 different stages until it becomes categorized within consumer memory. The first stage describes a 2-D retinal image which is a first impression of visual product stimuli that are projected to the viewpoint of the observer’s eyes. A retinal image is perceived without the consumer’s attention, and the information is unstructured and ‘uninterpreted’ (Julesz, 1984; Treisman, 1993). In the second stage, the 2-D retinal product impression is further processed, so that elements such as lines and edges of the stimulus are detected and “sharpened” (image-based stage). Further in the surface-based stage, general surface and spatial information is recovered. True 3-D processing first occurs in the final stage, called the object-based stage, since the product perception process does not end with the mere representation of all the visible lines and surfaces. Instead, it is assumed that during perception surface information is related to general stored knowledge about the intrinsic nature of the 3-D object (Biederman, 1987; Palmer, 1999). An example would be aspects of products that are occluded from the current viewpoint (e.g., the backs or undersides of a camera, TV, car, bottle, etc.). By simply perceiving the curved lines and surfaces of a bottle, the observer is able to make clear predictions regarding the probable appearance and properties of the back of the bottle. Therefore, hidden assumptions about the nature of the visual world are also required to enable the inclusion of information about unseen surfaces or parts of surfaces.

Since line perception is an earlier process than other processes such as surface and texture perception, lines are the major visual elements that determine object recognition and similarity (cf. Biederman & Ju, 1992). Based on the ideas of Biederman & Ju, one can expect that products of a brand that share major line characteristics (e.g. the car grill or line-silhouette of the lights of a BMW car or its overall silhouette) should be considered as more similar (i.e. stronger brand familiarity) than products that share similar colors, textures or other surface elements but have different line-structure. When companies introduce redesigned products, consumers are confronted with differences between the lines and surfaces of the old and redesigned product. These modifications are hypothesized to influence both the perception of product novelty and brand recognition in the following ways:

H1: Line modification has a strong (—) negative effect on brand recognition. Surface modification has a small (-) negative effect on brand recognition.

H2: Line modification has a strong (+++) positive effect on novelty. Surface modification has a strong (+) positive effect on novelty.
To test our hypotheses, we redesigned the appearance of a Nokia phone. The 2-D stimuli were designed by a professional designer and differed on the degree of line and surface modifications. Stimuli were black and white sketches, no brand name was included. Our benchmark stimulus was a sketch of the most sold Nokia cell phone among our respondents. In study 1 (N=17), we assessed perceived line and surface changes to check our manipulations. Experts (Bachelor in design) compared 6 stimuli with the benchmark. Our stimuli indeed differed in line and surface modifications. Next to assess brand recognition, we asked the same respondents to indicate the brand of the stimuli and their degree of certainty on this. To test hypothesis 1, we correlated the perceived line and perceived surface modifications with brand recognition. Analyses showed a significant negative effect of both line (Pearson R=.47; P<.001) and surface changes (Pearson R=.28; P<.01) on brand recognition. Partial correlations showed that controlled for surface changes [line changes] the correlation remained significant (Pearson R=.41; P<.001) [correlation became insignificant (Pearson R=.10; P=.32)]. This confirms our hypothesis.

In a second study (N=17), we tested hypothesis 1 and 2. We asked respondents to compare our stimuli (differences in degree of line and surface change based on study 1) with our benchmark stimulus on newness and aesthetic evaluation. Results in this study for hypothesis 1 are comparable to those in study 1. Hypothesis 2 was tested with the use of partial correlations because of high correlation between surface and line change. Partial correlations showed that controlled for surface changes [line changes] the correlation was significant (Pearson R=.26; P<.001) [correlation was insignificant (Pearson R=.10; P=.32)]. This partly confirms our hypothesis 2.

As a next step we will make experiments with a bigger sample and with different products. In addition to that we will measure the interaction between line and surface changes on brand recognition and novelty as well as overall preference. The results will be presented at the conference.

The contribution of this research to consumer science is two fold: Firstly, it shows how different types of visual characteristics (line and surface) affect brand recognition, novelty and preference. Secondly, it provides an in-depth understanding of processes of product perception and should motivate further research into that direction. Whereas consumer information processing has mostly concentrated on the part of categorization and knowledge representation, this research focuses on the mostly overlooked part of (product) perception.

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Heuristic and Systematic Information Processing when Valuating Multiple Gains and Losses
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Extended Abstract
This research attempts to enhance our understanding of people’s preferences for separating or combining gains and losses. According to the normative decision theory of rational choice, people should demonstrate indifference towards the combination or separation of negative and positive events (Thaler, 1985). However, there are many examples and empirical studies demonstrating that preferences systematically violate normative decision theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). E.g. winning $90 all at once is not perceived as being equal to winning $40 and $50 separately. Inspired by Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (1979) a substantial body of literature has investigated the patterns of preference formation when judging consolidated versus segregated gains and losses. Thaler’s hedonic editing rules are based on the value function of the prospect theory and predict a preference for consolidating multiple losses and integrating multiple gains; empirical research confirmed these predictions (Thaler, 1985). Later studies confirmed the preference for segregating gains but stated—contrary to theory—a preference for segregating losses also (Linville & Fischer, 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Explanations for these findings refer to the theory of renewable resources (Linville & Fischer, 1991) or to the quasi hedonic-editing hypothesis (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). However, this previous research focuses on the emotional impact of segregated versus integrated gains and losses and the role of motivational underpinnings of preference formation for multiple gains and losses remain unclear.

Based on the heuristic-systematic model (HSM) of human information processing (Chaiken, 1987) this research attempts to shed light on the underlying logic of judgment of multiple gains and losses. The HSM differentiates systematic from heuristic information processing. Whereas heuristic processing is characterized by a relatively effortless application of simple decision rules, systematic processing is marked by a more cognitively demanding comprehensive analysis of judgment-relevant information. Which mode of information processing predominates depends on the individual’s current motivation (Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996). It is stated that accuracy motivation will enhance systematic processing (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Numerous studies have demonstrated the differential influence of the two modes of information processing (heuristic and systematic) on judgment and decision making: Hsee and
Rottenstreich’s (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004) experiments demonstrate the influence of the two modes of information processing on valuation and subsequently on preferences for segregation and integration of gains and losses. Additionally, research by Agrawal and Maheswaran (Agrawal & Maheswaran, 2005) lends support to the assumption that accuracy motivation eliminates outcome-biased judgments.

Based on the previous research on dual process models and valuation we predict that accuracy motivation will foster systematic information processing and will therefore take a substantial impact on how segregated versus integrated gains and losses are perceived and valued. To test the predictions an experimental study was conducted. 160 undergraduate students completed the study for a payment of $5. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups. They were primed either to be accuracy motivated or to valuate by feelings and assigned to either a gain or a loss scenario. They were presented both an integrated and a segregated scenario and indicated their preference for one of the scenarios.

In general, the current research establishes that accuracy motivation strongly influences or even reverses preferences when people valuate segregated versus integrated gains. However, the results obtained by this research raise interesting issues on how the type of event (gain versus loss) elicits different valuations of multiple events. We assume that loss aversion and specific emotions related to losses influence the way outcomes are valuated. Therefore, further work is needed to scrutinize the effects of emotions in the context of the valuation of segregated versus integrated losses.

References

On the Importance of Non-dominant Cultural Dimensions: Effects of Vertical Individualism on Consumer Behaviour in Norway
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Introduction
Countries and cultures are typically characterised in terms of some dominant cultural variables. For example, the US is described as a vertical individualistic country, whereas Japan is vertical and collectivistic (Triandis 1995). Scandinavian countries are typically found to score high on horizontal dimensions (Nelson and Shavitt 2002; Silvera and Seger 2004). In this paper we promote the point that non-dominant cultural dimensions may play a more important role in explaining culturally related consumer behaviors than dominant dimensions.

Individualism-collectivism (INDCOL)
The original typology was later expanded with a new dimension of vertical vs. horizontal INDCOL (Singelis et al. 1995; Triandis and Gelfand 1998). Vertical dimension of INDOL captures the degree of status and inequality present in this orientation whereas horizontal dimension captures the degree of egalitarianism (Singelis et al. 1995; Triandis and Gelfand 1998). Intracultural variation in INDCOL is conceptualised as idiocentric vs. allocentric tendencies (Triandis et al. 1985).

Effects of vertical and horizontal INDOL
Vertical individualist subjects preferred domestic products only when they were perceived as superior, whereas vertical collectivist subjects were found to prefer domestic products regardless of product superiority (Gurhan-Canli and Maheswaran 2000). When individuals with independent self-construal where presented with promotion focused appeals, i.e. emphasizing gains, hopes and aspirations, the messages were more persuasive than when they were presented with prevention focused appeals, i.e. emphasizing avoidance of losses, duties and obligations (Aaker and Lee 2001). The reverse was true for individuals with interdependent self-con structs. There is also evidence that these effects may hold only for vertical cultures.
The Norwegian culture

The Norwegian culture has been characterized as horizontal rather than vertical (Nelson and Shavitt 2002; Silvera and Seger 2004). The literature points to the predominance of the horizontal value orientations in the Norwegian culture so the researchers tended to use these to explain consumer behavior. However as we argue further and as our data shows other non-dominant dimensions may account for important differences in consumer behavior.

Cultural Embeddedness of Products (CEP)

The concept of CEP is defined as the degree of the various types of national cultural meanings that are transferred from the culturally constituted world (McCracken 1986) to the product category by means of various cultural media (Jakubanecs and Supphellen 2004; Jakubanecs and Supphellen 2005). For instance a product category that has high degree of CEP can serve as a symbol of the national culture. Consumers can draw on the meanings embedded in the product category in order to build their private and social self-concepts as a certain national, promote their national identity and distinguish themselves from other nations (Jakubanecs and Supphellen 2004; Jakubanecs and Supphellen 2005). The dimensions of INDCOL are in turn likely to have effects on CEP due to the importance of INDCOL in the definition of self.

Hypotheses formulation

Intracultural variation becomes an important factor when non-dominant dimensions are likely to account for important consumer behavior. The case is illustrated by the Norwegian example. The horizontal dimensions of INDCOL do not focus on hierarchies or status, which are important in the concept of CEP. Consequently we do not expect these dominant cultural orientations to have effect on this consumer behavior variable. Vertical individualists are likely to engage in national identity construction in order to enhance their status, provided that having strong national identity has a positive connotation. Being a good citizen is valued in the Norwegian culture. Based on this discussion we formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: Vertical individualism has a strong positive effect on CEP (Cultural Embeddedness of Products) even in countries where vertical individualism is a non-dominant dimension (e.g., Scandinavia).

Methodology

The hypothesis was tested on a non-student sample from Norway (N=158). Vertical-horizontal INDCOL construct was measured by a 16-item, 7-point Likert scale (Singelis et al. 1995). The survey included 8 product categories: ketchup, bunad (a Norwegian national costume), cars, meat cakes (a national meat dish), make-up, goat cheese, pizza, cross-country skis. The concept of CEP was measured by a 22-item, 7-point Likert Cultural Embeddedness of Products (CEP) scale (Jakubanecs and Supphellen 2004; Jakubanecs and Supphellen 2005). The CEP Scale items included such as: “If I traveled abroad, and was asked about a typical Norwegian product, I could mention this one”, “When I was a child my family referred to this product as one of the symbols of our Norwegian identity”, “If other Norwegian were to see me using this product, he or she would perceive me as a typical Norwegian”.

Results

Consistent with earlier studies, horizontal collectivism is the most dominant dimension in the Norwegian culture followed by vertical collectivism. Norwegians are also high on horizontal individualism and as expected rather low on vertical individualism.

EFA of CEP Scale resulted in the three-dimensional structure (Tradition, Identity-building and Relationship CEP) for the eight product categories. The data was subjected to path analysis via LISREL (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993). Some of the LISREL model fit indices were: for ketchup-chi-square/df=2.895, GFI=.981, CFI=.974, RMSEA=.110; for pizza-chi-square/df=2.122, GFI=.983, CFI=.979, RMSEA=.085. The results strongly support H1. Vertical individualism has strong effects on the Tradition CEP (e.g., .359*** for meat cakes, .239** for cars; ***p<.01), Identity-building CEP (e.g., .510*** for meat cakes, .335*** for ketchup) for most product categories, whereas very few effects are observed for the other INDCOL dimensions.

Discussion

The most dominant cultural orientation of the Norwegian society-horizontal collectivism has little explanatory power when it comes to perception and construction of the national identity. The same conclusion applies to the other dominant dimension-horizontal individualism. Instead the dimension of vertical individualism, existence of which previously was ignored in the studies of the Norwegian culture, provides consistent explanations in this behavior cluster across the product categories. It could be the case that in the Norwegian culture, the national cultural meanings could serve status-enhancing purpose of being a good citizen which is important to vertical individualists.

Implications

We find support for importance of recognising and measuring allocentric and idiocentric tendencies when conducting cross-cultural consumer behavior studies. Reliance on nation-level studies and ignorance of the intracultural variation may weaken research validity.

References


Flip-Flopping of General Action and Inaction States: A Study on the Mental Representation of Action and Inaction Goals
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Extended Abstract
Being active or inactive is essential to human life. People, cultures, and eras appear to vary in requisite levels of energy and productivity. Thus, we examined the possibility that general tendencies to engage in or abstain from behavior irrespective of the domain (e.g., buying, using drugs, exercising) can be due to the setting of general action and inaction goals. We have investigated general action goals that reside at the meta-level of goal systems (for goal-facilitation of specific behaviors, see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Kruglanski, 1996; for the concept of general action and inaction goals, see Albarracin, in press). Action goals are generalized goals to engage in action (e.g., activated with instructions such as “go”). The counterpart to these action goals are general inaction goals, which are generalized goals to not engage in action (e.g., activated with instructions such as “rest”). Importantly, general action/inaction goals are diffuse desired ends that can mobilize the execution of more specific activities. Hence, their activation may trigger the pursuit or interruption of any particular (overt or covert) behavior that is subjectively relevant to the goal. Action goals imply a need to “do” irrespective of what one does; inaction goals imply a need to abstain from doing, irrespective of the domain of abstinence.

Research by Albarracin and her colleagues (see Albarracin, in press) have shown that people with general action goals preferred action-oriented tasks, identified more behaviors, performed better on a text comprehension task, and formed attitudes on a novel topic more than people with inaction goals. Given these differences in performance across these domains, we wanted to further explore these goals at the level of mental representations. In this study, we explored the activation of the action/inaction goals via a priming task with icons related to action and inaction and in turn, identified the conditions that led to the satisfaction of those goals. Our basic hypothesis is that the action goal is “turned off” via satisfaction of that goal and as a result, the inaction goal is “turned on.” Thus, the purposes of this study were 1) to identify if general action and inaction goals are mentally represented and 2) to examine the “on and off” manner of action and inaction goals.

In the first part of study, half of the participants were exposed to the action primes while the rest were exposed to the inaction primes. To prime action goals, black and white icons concerning specific actions (e.g., running, throwing, and dancing) were employed. To prime inaction goals, black and white icons concerning specific inactions (e.g., lying down, meditating, and relaxing) were used. Participants in the action prime condition were exposed to 10 pictures related to actions and 14 pictures neutral to action. Those in the inaction prime condition were exposed to 10 pictures related to inaction and 14 pictures neutral to inaction. The participants' task was to identify whether the black part of a picture was larger than the white part.

After the priming task, all participants were given a lexical decision task (LDT) to measure the activation level of action-related and inaction-related concepts. The LDT contained 10 action-related words (e.g., go, move, and create), 10 inaction-related words (e.g., relax, stop, and halt), 20 words neutral to action/inaction matched with inaction/action words on word length and frequency, and 20 other neutral words. The task had 10 blocks and each block contained 12 words. The blocks were divided into first and last five blocks to examine if the participants changed their action/inaction goal states.

Following the LDT, the participants were given an opportunity to either choose to work on questions from GRE (graduate record examination) or to rest. The choice made by participants served as our measure of the “on-off” nature of these goals. For instance, participants who are primed with action and then perform the LDT should “flip” to an inactive state and choose to rest.
First, it was hypothesized that action/inaction priming should lead to activation of associated concepts. Results showed differences in activation, such that the participants primed with action goal icons identified action-related words more quickly than the participants primed with inaction goal icons in the first five blocks of the LDT. However, in the last five blocks there was no significant difference between these two goal conditions on reaction times for action-related words. These results suggest that after performing half of the LDT, participants primed with action might have satisfied this goal by performing the LDT.

Second, it was hypothesized that participants in the action goal condition should flip to an inaction state following the LDT. Results showed that participants primed with an action goal were more likely to choose to rest than perform the GRE, and were more likely to do so than those primed with inaction. In sum, the results verified that these general goals can be activated, and suggest the “on and off” nature of these goals.

The study of these general goals may yield many practical applications in tandem with theoretical advances in goal theory and self-regulatory processes. For instance, action goals may exert effects inadvertently by being included in the title of an intervention such as “Youth in Action Against Drugs” (Lowell Housing Authority, 2005; the emphasis is ours). The richer effect here is that not only might people be primed for action, but that people with action goals are more likely in some instances to be persuaded as well. Albarracin and her colleagues (see Albarracin, in press) have shown that people are more likely to employ external information when they do not have prior attitudes about the topic, hence, are more apt to be persuaded. However, once the primed action goal is satisfied, then perhaps the window for persuasion is closed.

References

How Do Consumers Categorize Websites?
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Background
Similarity judgments have been used in many fields of research to serve as a cognitive categorization mechanism. This research presents the results of the perceptual mapping of stagnant (or mouse-free) images of multiple websites from the consumer perspective. The goal of our research is not from a decision making perspective, but more from a consumer perception framework. We aim to disentangle the internet into multiple separable pieces or frames, gather information from consumers on those frames, and then elaborate on ways in which they are categorized and conceptualized.

One of the key foundations of this pilot research effort is the de-activation of an otherwise interactive medium. Our effort was to gain insight as to how consumers may initially view websites—as images rather than “clickable” interfaces. We contend, then, that at first glance, a user categorizes websites according to some set of attributes. Those attributes, if further understood, can help guide our understanding of deployment of “effective” websites, from a consumer-centric viewpoint. Although the foundations of cognitive categorization are principally psychological, many other fields have employed them through use of mathematical techniques. Broken down at the lowest level, we see or discuss “things”, which then, in order to control for chaos and cognitive boundaries we have, we must categorize. (Smith and Medlin, 1981)

The fields of human factors, information systems, and marketing have also focused on the interesting implications of the internet as an interactive medium. Marketing research often studies the internet as an advertising medium and sees similarities with other forms such as television, where we have visual cues to stimulate action on the part of the consumer. Yet, we make note of something entirely unique in internet environments—the ability to have constant interaction with our consumer. (Hoffman and Novak, 1996) Consumer choice and decision making thus drives much of the literature on how a consumer can interact with the internet. (Peterson et al, 1997; Mandel and Johnson, 2002)

Hence, the contribution of this initial study is to break down and attempt to ascertain “first impressions” of consumers by using static as opposed to dynamic images. We posit that clickstream data, by focusing on either one consumer or one website, and presenting the internet in its full interactive complexity, may not be able to capture those initial categorizations which consumers make.

Experiment
Sixty-seven marketing undergraduates participated in this within subject study by completing a two part survey. Due to the subject matter of this study, namely internet websites, and the experience level of the participants, we considered this a homogeneous data set. Given a total of ten websites, part 1 of the study design called for a set of forty-five paired similarity/dissimilarity judgments. Two context areas, cameras and tourism, were selected, within which we selected five websites each. Our conjecture is that the participants in our study